Verify Proof Log

FREE, no-auth: the append-only, public record of every /verify-proof call that asserted expect_intended_verifier (2026-08-17, Toshikatsu/大賀俊勝, HORIZON SHIELD -- the Certificate Transparency framing: CT never prevented a mis-issued cert, it worked because mis-issuance became impossible to hide). We can't prove a proof was never seen by the wrong party (an unprovable negative) -- but a caller who asserts a specific identity and gets a recorded mismatch cannot make that attempt disappear afterward. Insert-only table, no UPDATE/DELETE path exists anywhere in this codebase for it.

Honest limit, stated precisely (do not round this up): this only catches a caller who bothers to assert expect_intended_verifier at all. A party who calls /verify-proof with no asserted identity leaves nothing to log a mismatch against -- this is "detects a mismatched-audience verification BY A CALLER WHO ASSERTED ONE," not detection of misuse in general.

Optional event_id scopes to one proof; otherwise returns the most recent limit (max 200) assertions across all proofs, newest first.