Detect money mule recruitment attempts

The text content to analyze

Top-level alias for options.support_threshold. Minimum severity to show crisis support resources (default: high). Critical always shows.

Top-level alias for options.include_evidence. When false, the evidence array is omitted from the response. Default: true.

Opaque, signed token returned by a previous call to this endpoint. Pass it back here to continue the analysis with prior context — no need to re-send prior_messages. The token IS the state; we store nothing.

When true, discard any continuation_token and treat this call as the first turn of a new conversation.

Optional customer-side identifier for this turn. If provided, evidence pointers in the continuation_token will reference this id so you can map detections back to your own messages. If omitted we use a deterministic short hash of the text.

Deprecated, no effect: results are never cached — every request runs a fresh evaluation and nothing derived from the input is stored. The field is still accepted so existing integrations do not break.

Your unique identifier (e.g. message ID, content ID) for correlating Tuteliq results with your own system. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads so you can match alerts to the original content.

Your end-customer identifier for multi-tenant / B2B2C scenarios. If you serve multiple customers (schools, apps, brands) from a single API key, set this to route webhook alerts to the correct customer. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads as "customerId".

Per-call override of your account incident logging setting. When set, it takes precedence for THIS request: true forces the incident to be persisted, false suppresses persistence. Omit to use your account default (which itself defaults to enabled). Useful to suppress logging for test traffic or to opt specific calls in or out.

True when the caller declared an adult age group but the speaker states a minor age in the message or in the earlier turns sent with it. The declared age was not used. Nothing is escalated by this on its own; the analysis runs as if no age had been sent. Worth investigating at your end: an age check that disagrees with what the user says is what a bypassed age verification looks like. A stated ADULT age never has this effect. Absent unless it applied.

Human-readable explanation. Present only when declared_age_overridden is true.

True when a declared context.conversation_type would have capped an urgent action to flag_for_review and did not, because the case is acute: the analysis named an acute marker, or a separate reading found a person at risk now with something happening as the text is written. A reading that gave no answer also keeps the urgency. Absent otherwise, and never present together with conversation_type_applied.

Human-readable explanation. Present only when urgency_kept is true.

Present only when a caller-declared context.conversation_type actually changed routing. Confirms the setting was taken into account, rather than leaving the platform to assume it was.

romance-scam only. Present when a detection was cleared because the reason given for not appearing on video or in person was a passing obstacle (a router down, out of data, an early start) rather than a standing property of the claimed persona (a deployment, a rig, a clearance), and the only tactics were IDENTITY_FABRICATION / SECRECY_REQUEST / URGENCY_PRESSURE. Before this, an ordinary "no wifi until Thursday" message was told its sender was fabricating an identity (#224). Absent when the gate did not fire.

romance-scam only. Present when a result that asked for no action was not reported as a detection, because a separate reading found the message is an account of something that is over, or is about nobody in particular (a warning, a lesson, a story about a relative years ago). Never present when the analysis asked for monitoring or review.

Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a romantic relationship with someone met online and never met in person; that person has never been seen on video or gives a reason they cannot be seen or checked; talk of love, marriage or keeping it private. The result is raised to flag_for_review. This pattern is complete before any money is asked for.

Human-readable explanation. Present only when unseen_partner_raised is true.

Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a declaration of lifelong or exclusive devotion to the reader; the message itself showing that the two barely know each other or have not met; and nothing of a shared life in it. The result is raised to review, never higher. This is how a romance scam opens, before anything is asked for, and it can also be sincere, so a moderator decides. Absent otherwise. ADVISORY: for a moderator UI and triage queues. Branch production logic on recommended_action.

Human-readable explanation. Present only when love_bombing_raised is true.

Romance scam only. True when, across a whole conversation (earlier turns submitted, or a conversation pasted into text), a separate reading found that money moves the way it does between people who share a life (a cost split, a sum covered and paid back, a shared expense), with no unmet or unverifiable partner, unusual payment method, crisis, secrecy or promised returns. A result at review or block is then brought down to monitor. Only recommended_action changes; detected, the categories, the level and the score are as the analysis gave them. Never applied to a single message, a declared minor, a kept urgency, or a result another reading cleared or raised. Absent otherwise.

Human-readable explanation. Present only when ordinary_shared_finances_capped is true.

True when an alert was lowered because a separate reading found a text that works AGAINST the harm it describes: explaining it, warning about it, counselling or supporting someone, reporting it or asking what to do. Two outcomes: with nobody at risk in the text and the detector itself reading the speaker as describing someone else, the result is nothing detected at monitor; with a person at risk and a responsible adult in the text already acting, an urgent action becomes flag_for_review and the finding is kept. A text that does the harm, a person at risk with nobody acting, anything happening as the text is written, and any failed reading are never lowered. Absent when not applied.

Human-readable explanation, naming which of the two outcomes applied. Present only when protective_speech_capped is true.

The detection endpoint that produced this result

A signal was observed at ANY severity (including low / monitor cases). For production branching prefer recommended_action (flag_for_moderator / immediate_intervention indicate action required).

Severity score (0.0-1.0)

Model confidence in the classification (0.0-1.0)

Age-adjusted risk score (0.0-1.0)

Human-readable severity level

Recommended action to take

Explanation of the detection result

Language code used for analysis

Language support maturity

Credits consumed by this request

Processing time in milliseconds

Opaque, signed token carrying derived analysis state. Pass it back on the next call to continue the conversation without re-sending history. Server stores nothing — the token IS the state.

ISO 8601 timestamp at which the continuation_token expires (24h default).

How the prior analysis state was sourced for this call: "token" (decoded from continuation_token), "fresh" (no prior state), "reset" (reset_conversation forced a fresh start).

Echo of the external_id you provided in the request

Echo of the customer_id you provided in the request

The model's own conclusion on whether the speaker is recruiting the listener into moving money, or asking about/investigating an arrangement run by someone else (e.g. a bank fraud investigator interviewing a suspected victim). Feeds into recommended_action -- see action_capped below.

True when speaker_stance capped a suppressive recommended_action (e.g. block) below itself, because the model identified the speaker as describing/countering a third party's conduct rather than deploying it themselves.

Human-readable explanation of the action_capped adjustment, present only when action_capped is true.

True when speaker_stance capped severity/risk_score/level at a ceiling (not to zero) for the same reason as action_capped -- a genuine third-party disclosure or exposure report still reaches human review at the ceiling; only a purely educational/protective description is prevented from reading as comparable to a real attack.

Human-readable explanation of the severity_capped adjustment, present only when severity_capped is true.