Upload organization logo
Uploads the organization's logo. The body is the raw image (PNG, JPEG or WebP, at most 2 MiB), not multipart. Returns the organization with logo set to the public URL the image is served from. The previous logo is deleted only after the new one is stored. Requires org:manage and an active subscription.
Request
- Base URL: https://api.elaichi.ai
- URL: https://api.elaichi.ai/organization/{id}/logo
- Auth: HTTP bearer
Path parameters
Organization id (org_…).
Response
OK
Organization id (org_…) — the value for X-Organization-Id.
Immutable after creation.
The stored plan: gold, black, or none when locked. This is not the same as the effective entitlement — read GET /organization/{id}/entitlements before gating a feature on it.
Data location fixed at creation: us/eu pin a hard jurisdiction, apac is a placement hint.
Set when Elaichi granted this organization an indefinite trial, otherwise null. Unlocked with no end date: no countdown, no expiry email, billing still reachable.
Free-form org settings. PATCH /organization/{id} REPLACES this object wholesale.
Public URL of the logo image, or null.
Whether the caller may delete this organization: the org:delete permission, which only the Org Owner role holds. Server-computed, so branch on this rather than inspecting roles. Always false on rows that have no member context to compute it from, such as the organization list GET /organization. It never overstates: trust it when true, and read GET /user/me or GET /organization/{id} (both compute it) when you need it for a list row.
Whether the caller may change this organization's settings: the org:manage permission that PATCH /organization/{id} requires, and the organization is neither suspended nor in its deletion grace period. Server-computed, and false wherever can_delete is false for lack of a member context; it never overstates.
Whether Elaichi support may sign in as this organization's members to help them. true by default. When false, every request made through such a support session against this organization is refused with 403 staff_impersonation_blocked, reads included, and the organization is left out of that session's GET /user/me and GET /organization. Changed with PATCH /organization/{id} (org:manage).
Whether members must hold a second factor to act in this organization. false by default. When true, a signed-in session that has not shown a second factor (no TOTP challenge at login, no passkey sign-in, no factor enrolled since) is refused on every organization-scoped route, reads included, with 403 mfa_setup_required; error.details.has_second_factor says whether the person already has one and only needs to sign in with it. Exempt: org API tokens, Elaichi support sessions, and a session signed in through this organization's own SSO connection. MCP connections made before it was switched on, or from a session without a factor, are refused until the person connects again. Turning it off only lifts the organization requirement: a member who set up an authenticator app of their own is still challenged for it at every non-passkey sign-in. Changed with PATCH /organization/{id} (org:manage, interactive session only).
Whether the CALLER may turn mfa_required ON right now: can_manage, from an interactive session that would itself pass the check it is about to create. false — with the reason in can_require_mfa_reason — when switching it on would lock the caller out of this organization. The PATCH refuses that regardless with 409 mfa_setup_required. Turning it OFF is not governed by this field; it needs a step-up.
A sentence saying why can_require_mfa is false for a caller who can otherwise manage the organization. null otherwise.
Set when a deletion has been scheduled (DELETE /organization/{id}). The organization is read-only until purge_after. Null otherwise.
When a scheduled deletion becomes permanent — 30 days after deletion_scheduled_at. Null unless scheduled.
Whether the caller may cancel a scheduled deletion: the org:manage permission, and only while purge_after is still ahead. Server-computed like can_delete, and false on rows with no member context. Read purge_after to tell "too late" from "not yours to undo".
Whether the CALLER may connect an app (MCP OAuth consent) to this organization right now: false while it is suspended, scheduled for deletion, or has no active plan. Server-computed by the same gate POST /oauth/authorize-request/{id}/approve calls; present only on member-scoped responses. authorize_apps_blocked_reason says which.
Why can_authorize_apps is false, in the gate's own order: blocked, then pending_deletion (even when the subscription is also gone, since a soft delete cancels it), then no_plan. null when connecting is open.
Changes
No recorded changes to this operation across all 1 revision of this API.