---
title: "Detect tech-facilitated gender-based violence"
method: POST
path: "/api/v1/safety/tfgbv"
tags: ["Safety Extended"]
---

# Detect tech-facilitated gender-based violence

`POST /api/v1/safety/tfgbv`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://api.tuteliq.ai`
- URL: `https://api.tuteliq.ai/api/v1/safety/tfgbv`
- Auth: one of:
  - HTTP bearer
  - API key in header `x-api-key`

Analyzes text for tech-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) patterns including image-based abuse, cyber stalking, online harassment, doxing, impersonation, outing, post-separation abuse, sextortion, digital coercion, sexualised deepfakes, and gendered hate speech. Returns TFGBV amplifier assessment and intersectionality flags.

## Request body

- object
  - `text` string, required: The text content to analyze
  - `context` object
    - `language` string: Language code (e.g., "en"). 32 supported languages: en is stable, the other 31 are beta (ar, bg, cs, da, de, el, es, et, fi, fr, ga, hr, hu, it, ja, ko, lt, lv, mt, nl, no, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk, sl, sv, tr, uk, zh). The code is the documented form; the English name of a supported language is also accepted ("English" as "en"). A region or script suffix is read as its base language ("en-US" as "en"), and "nb" or "nn" as "no". A value that is not supported is refused with a 400 that lists the supported codes. Omit the field, or send "auto", and the language is detected from the text.
    - `conversation_type` 'fraud_report' | 'abuse_report' | 'support_disclosure' | 'helpline' | 'clinical' | 'investigative' | 'legal' | 'advisory' | 'training' | 'journalism' | 'research' | 'moderation_review' | 'healthcare' | 'law_enforcement' | 'education' | 'family' | 'workplace' | 'dating' | 'adult_community' | 'direct_message' | 'group_chat' | 'public_post' | 'customer_service' | 'gaming_chat': Optional, no default: omit it and behaviour is unchanged. The setting this conversation was captured in, declared by your platform from its own configuration, never from end-user input. A declared setting names the responsible party in the conversation: a counsellor or helpline worker (`helpline`, `clinical`), a clinician (`healthcare`), an officer or investigator (`law_enforcement`, `investigative`), an adviser taking a report (`fraud_report`, `abuse_report`, `support_disclosure`, `advisory`), a moderator (`moderation_review`), a lawyer, trainer, journalist or researcher (`legal`, `training`, `journalism`, `research`), a teacher, tutor or safeguarding lead (`education`), a parent or guardian (`family`). In any of these settings, a conversation in which a person is at risk, that responsible party is already handling it, and nothing is happening as the text is written, is kept visible at `monitor` without an alert, and `protective_speech_capped` says so. Harm being done in the conversation, by anyone including the responsible party, a person at risk with nobody acting, and anything acute alert as they would with no setting. Where the harm is discussed and not enacted (`fraud_report`, `abuse_report`, `support_disclosure`, `helpline`, `clinical`, `investigative`, `legal`, `advisory`, `training`, `journalism`, `research`, `moderation_review`) an urgent action is also capped to `flag_for_review`, and the response echoes `conversation_type_applied`. `direct_message`, `group_chat`, `public_post`, `customer_service` and `gaming_chat` change nothing. In `education` and `family` this applies only when the speaker is not the person at risk: a young person speaking for themselves to a teacher or a parent alerts as with no setting.
    - `age_group` string: Age group (e.g., "13-15")
    - `ageGroup` string: Age group (camelCase alias, e.g., "under 18")
    - `platform` string: Platform name (e.g., "Discord", "Telegram")
    - `country` string: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (e.g., "GB", "US", "SE") for geo-localised helpline data. Falls back to user profile country if omitted.
    - `prior_messages` object[]: Prior turns of this conversation, oldest first, submitted by you for this request only -- Tuteliq stores no message content, so nothing here is retained after the call completes. Use this when you already have the whole conversation in hand; use continuation_token instead when you are calling once per new message as it arrives.
      - `role` string, required: Role of the sender (e.g., "user", "contact", "adult", "child")
      - `text` string, required: Message text
      - `timestamp` string: ISO 8601 timestamp of the message (optional)
    - `conversation_history` object[]: Deprecated: use prior_messages instead (same shape, same behavior). Kept for backward compatibility.
      - `role` string, required: Role of the sender (e.g., "user", "contact", "adult", "child")
      - `text` string, required: Message text
      - `timestamp` string: ISO 8601 timestamp of the message (optional)
  - `options` object
    - `include_evidence` boolean: Include evidence excerpts in response. Default: true.
    - `support_threshold` 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Minimum severity level to include crisis support resources. Defaults to "high". Note: "critical" severity always includes support resources regardless of this setting.
    - `verdict_only` boolean: Fast mode: omit the per-message `message_analysis` array from the response. All other fields are unchanged. Cuts output length (and therefore latency) significantly on multi-turn input.
  - `support_threshold` 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Top-level alias for options.support_threshold. Minimum severity to show crisis support resources (default: high). Critical always shows.
  - `include_evidence` boolean: Top-level alias for options.include_evidence. When false, the `evidence` array is omitted from the response. Default: true.
  - `continuation_token` string: Opaque, signed token returned by a previous call to this endpoint. Pass it back here to continue the analysis with prior context — no need to re-send prior_messages. The token IS the state; we store nothing.
  - `reset_conversation` boolean: When true, discard any continuation_token and treat this call as the first turn of a new conversation.
  - `message_id` string: Optional customer-side identifier for this turn. If provided, evidence pointers in the continuation_token will reference this id so you can map detections back to your own messages. If omitted we use a deterministic short hash of the text.
  - `bypass_cache` boolean: Deprecated, no effect: results are never cached — every request runs a fresh evaluation and nothing derived from the input is stored. The field is still accepted so existing integrations do not break.
  - `external_id` string: Your unique identifier (e.g. message ID, content ID) for correlating Tuteliq results with your own system. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads so you can match alerts to the original content.
  - `customer_id` string: Your end-customer identifier for multi-tenant / B2B2C scenarios. If you serve multiple customers (schools, apps, brands) from a single API key, set this to route webhook alerts to the correct customer. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads as "customerId".
  - `metadata` object: Arbitrary key-value pairs for additional context (e.g. { "channel": "discord", "region": "eu" }). Stored with the detection result, echoed in the response, and included in webhook payloads. Maximum 20 properties.
  - `incident_moderation_enabled` boolean: Per-call override of your account incident logging setting. When set, it takes precedence for THIS request: true forces the incident to be persisted, false suppresses persistence. Omit to use your account default (which itself defaults to enabled). Useful to suppress logging for test traffic or to opt specific calls in or out.

## Response `200`

Default Response

- object
  - `declared_age_overridden` boolean: True when the caller declared an adult age group but the speaker states a minor age in the message or in the earlier turns sent with it. The declared age was not used. Nothing is escalated by this on its own; the analysis runs as if no age had been sent. Worth investigating at your end: an age check that disagrees with what the user says is what a bypassed age verification looks like. A stated ADULT age never has this effect. Absent unless it applied.
  - `declared_age_overridden_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when declared_age_overridden is true.
  - `urgency_kept` boolean: True when a declared `context.conversation_type` would have capped an urgent action to `flag_for_review` and did not, because the case is acute: the analysis named an acute marker, or a separate reading found a person at risk now with something happening as the text is written. A reading that gave no answer also keeps the urgency. Absent otherwise, and never present together with `conversation_type_applied`.
  - `urgency_kept_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when urgency_kept is true.
  - `conversation_type_applied` string: Present only when a caller-declared `context.conversation_type` actually changed routing. Confirms the setting was taken into account, rather than leaving the platform to assume it was.
  - `absence_reason_cleared` boolean: romance-scam only. Present when a detection was cleared because the reason given for not appearing on video or in person was a passing obstacle (a router down, out of data, an early start) rather than a standing property of the claimed persona (a deployment, a rig, a clearance), and the only tactics were IDENTITY_FABRICATION / SECRECY_REQUEST / URGENCY_PRESSURE. Before this, an ordinary "no wifi until Thursday" message was told its sender was fabricating an identity (#224). Absent when the gate did not fire.
  - `past_account_cleared` boolean: romance-scam only. Present when a result that asked for no action was not reported as a detection, because a separate reading found the message is an account of something that is over, or is about nobody in particular (a warning, a lesson, a story about a relative years ago). Never present when the analysis asked for monitoring or review.
  - `unseen_partner_raised` boolean: Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a romantic relationship with someone met online and never met in person; that person has never been seen on video or gives a reason they cannot be seen or checked; talk of love, marriage or keeping it private. The result is raised to `flag_for_review`. This pattern is complete before any money is asked for.
  - `unseen_partner_raised_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when unseen_partner_raised is true.
  - `love_bombing_raised` boolean: Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a declaration of lifelong or exclusive devotion to the reader; the message itself showing that the two barely know each other or have not met; and nothing of a shared life in it. The result is raised to review, never higher. This is how a romance scam opens, before anything is asked for, and it can also be sincere, so a moderator decides. Absent otherwise. ADVISORY: for a moderator UI and triage queues. Branch production logic on `recommended_action`.
  - `love_bombing_raised_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when love_bombing_raised is true.
  - `ordinary_shared_finances_capped` boolean: Romance scam only. True when, across a whole conversation (earlier turns submitted, or a conversation pasted into `text`), a separate reading found that money moves the way it does between people who share a life (a cost split, a sum covered and paid back, a shared expense), with no unmet or unverifiable partner, unusual payment method, crisis, secrecy or promised returns. A result at review or block is then brought down to `monitor`. Only `recommended_action` changes; `detected`, the categories, the level and the score are as the analysis gave them. Never applied to a single message, a declared minor, a kept urgency, or a result another reading cleared or raised. Absent otherwise.
  - `ordinary_shared_finances_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when ordinary_shared_finances_capped is true.
  - `protective_speech_capped` boolean: True when a separate reading lowered an alert to `monitor`. Two cases. A review alert on a text that recounts or reports this harm as something that is over, with nobody at risk now and nothing still standing. And, where your platform declared a `context.conversation_type` that names the responsible party in the conversation, a person at risk whom that party is already handling, with nothing still standing (no threat, no demand, no images still up or still held to be shared). Anything still standing keeps the alert in every setting. Absent when not applied.
  - `protective_speech_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when protective_speech_capped is true.
  - `endpoint` string: The detection endpoint that produced this result
  - `detected` boolean: A signal was observed at ANY severity (including low / monitor cases). For production branching prefer `recommended_action` (`flag_for_moderator` / `immediate_intervention` indicate action required).
  - `severity` number: Severity score (0.0-1.0)
  - `confidence` number: Model confidence in the classification (0.0-1.0)
  - `risk_score` number: Age-adjusted risk score (0.0-1.0)
  - `level` 'none' | 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Human-readable severity level
  - `categories` object[]: Detected categories with confidence scores
    - `tag` string: Category identifier (e.g., "URGENCY_FABRICATION")
    - `label` string: Human-readable category label
    - `confidence` number: Confidence for this category (0.0-1.0)
  - `evidence` object[]: Evidence excerpts supporting the detection
    - `text` string: Evidence excerpt from the input
    - `tactic` string: The tactic or indicator this evidence relates to
    - `weight` number: Evidence weight (0.0-1.0)
  - `age_calibration` object
    - `applied` boolean
    - `age_group` string
    - `multiplier` number
  - `recommended_action` string: Recommended action to take
  - `rationale` string: Explanation of the detection result
  - `message_analysis` object[]: Per-message risk breakdown (only present when prior_messages is provided)
    - `message_index` number: Index of the message in the conversation history (1-based)
    - `risk_score` number: Risk score for this individual message (0.0-1.0)
    - `flags` string[]: Tactics or indicators detected in this message
    - `summary` string: Brief explanation of this message's risk contribution
  - `language` string: Language code used for analysis
  - `language_status` 'stable' | 'beta': Language support maturity
  - `credits_used` number: Credits consumed by this request
  - `processing_time_ms` number: Processing time in milliseconds
  - `continuation_token` string: Opaque, signed token carrying derived analysis state. Pass it back on the next call to continue the conversation without re-sending history. Server stores nothing — the token IS the state.
  - `continuation_expires_at` string: ISO 8601 timestamp at which the continuation_token expires (24h default).
  - `state_source` 'token' | 'fresh' | 'reset': How the prior analysis state was sourced for this call: "token" (decoded from continuation_token), "fresh" (no prior state), "reset" (reset_conversation forced a fresh start).
  - `external_id` string: Echo of the external_id you provided in the request
  - `customer_id` string: Echo of the customer_id you provided in the request
  - `metadata` object: Echo of the metadata you provided in the request
  - `support` object: Country-specific crisis helplines and response guidance (only for high/critical severity)
    - `country` string
    - `country_name` string
    - `emergency_number` string
    - `helplines` object[]
      - `name` string
      - `number` string
      - `description` string
      - `category` string
      - `available` string
    - `response_guide` object
      - `category` string
      - `immediateActions` string[]
      - `resources` object[]
        - `name` string
        - `description` string
        - `url` string
  - `willing_exchange_capped` boolean: True when a review alert was lowered to `monitor` because a separate reading found a message about something two people share willingly: no pressure, nothing done without the other person, no hostility, and no sign of a minor. What defines this harm is the absence of consent. It never applies when the declared age group is, or includes, people under 18, and never to anything stronger than `flag_for_review` or to sextortion, a deepfake, stalking, doxing or outing. It never clears to `none`, so a conversation that turns stays visible. Absent unless it applied.
  - `willing_exchange_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when willing_exchange_capped is true.
  - `speaker_role` 'enacting' | 'experiencing' | 'reporting_other' | 'self_directed' | 'unclear': The speaker's relationship to the conduct described, derived from the content by a separate classifier so it cannot move the verdict. `enacting` = the speaker is carrying the abuse out. `experiencing` = the abuse is directed at them, which is what a victim disclosure looks like. `reporting_other` = a bystander, support worker or professional describing someone else's conduct. `self_directed` = the speaker refers only to themselves. `unclear` = cannot be determined. This is the ONLY field that separates a victim from a perpetrator on this endpoint: `detected`, `severity` and `recommended_action` are the same for both, because the abuse being described is equally real either way. Read it before you action the sender, or you will sanction the person who reported the abuse. DESCRIPTIVE ONLY: it never changes `detected`, `severity`, `risk_score` or `recommended_action`, and it is derived independently of the caller-declared `conversation_type`. Same vocabulary as `speaker_role` on /safety/bullying.

## Changes

- **2026-10-19** `8490332e0031`: 1 info
  - endpoint added

[Operation history](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/changes/api/v1/safety/tfgbv/post.md)

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/revisions/8490332e0031?raw)