---
title: "Detect linguistic distress-signal patterns (pre-vulnerability indicators)"
method: POST
path: "/api/v1/safety/distress-signals"
tags: ["Safety Extended"]
---

# Detect linguistic distress-signal patterns (pre-vulnerability indicators)

`POST /api/v1/safety/distress-signals`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://api.tuteliq.ai`
- URL: `https://api.tuteliq.ai/api/v1/safety/distress-signals`
- Auth: one of:
  - HTTP bearer
  - API key in header `x-api-key`

Analyses text for the presence of linguistic patterns historically associated with distress (loneliness expressions, isolation language, hopelessness phrases, trust-seeking openers, withdrawal references, family-conflict mentions). Returns pattern detections and, where applicable, downstream exploitation-risk assessment (grooming, sextortion, trafficking, radicalisation). Does NOT infer the author’s inner emotional state. Intended for child-safety contexts as a safety component (EU AI Act Art 5(1)(f) safety exception); not intended for workplace or general education monitoring.

## Request body

- object
  - `text` string, required: The text content to analyze
  - `context` object
    - `language` string: Language code (e.g., "en"). 32 supported languages: en is stable, the other 31 are beta (ar, bg, cs, da, de, el, es, et, fi, fr, ga, hr, hu, it, ja, ko, lt, lv, mt, nl, no, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk, sl, sv, tr, uk, zh). The code is the documented form; the English name of a supported language is also accepted ("English" as "en"). A region or script suffix is read as its base language ("en-US" as "en"), and "nb" or "nn" as "no". A value that is not supported is refused with a 400 that lists the supported codes. Omit the field, or send "auto", and the language is detected from the text.
    - `conversation_type` 'fraud_report' | 'abuse_report' | 'support_disclosure' | 'helpline' | 'clinical' | 'investigative' | 'legal' | 'advisory' | 'training' | 'journalism' | 'research' | 'moderation_review' | 'healthcare' | 'law_enforcement' | 'education' | 'family' | 'workplace' | 'dating' | 'adult_community' | 'direct_message' | 'group_chat' | 'public_post' | 'customer_service' | 'gaming_chat': Optional, no default: omit it and behaviour is unchanged. The setting this conversation was captured in, declared by your platform from its own configuration, never from end-user input. A declared setting names the responsible party in the conversation: a counsellor or helpline worker (`helpline`, `clinical`), a clinician (`healthcare`), an officer or investigator (`law_enforcement`, `investigative`), an adviser taking a report (`fraud_report`, `abuse_report`, `support_disclosure`, `advisory`), a moderator (`moderation_review`), a lawyer, trainer, journalist or researcher (`legal`, `training`, `journalism`, `research`), a teacher, tutor or safeguarding lead (`education`), a parent or guardian (`family`). In any of these settings, a conversation in which a person is at risk, that responsible party is already handling it, and nothing is happening as the text is written, is kept visible at `monitor` without an alert, and `protective_speech_capped` says so. Harm being done in the conversation, by anyone including the responsible party, a person at risk with nobody acting, and anything acute alert as they would with no setting. Where the harm is discussed and not enacted (`fraud_report`, `abuse_report`, `support_disclosure`, `helpline`, `clinical`, `investigative`, `legal`, `advisory`, `training`, `journalism`, `research`, `moderation_review`) an urgent action is also capped to `flag_for_review`, and the response echoes `conversation_type_applied`. `direct_message`, `group_chat`, `public_post`, `customer_service` and `gaming_chat` change nothing. In `education` and `family` this applies only when the speaker is not the person at risk: a young person speaking for themselves to a teacher or a parent alerts as with no setting.
    - `age_group` string: Age group (e.g., "13-15")
    - `ageGroup` string: Age group (camelCase alias, e.g., "under 18")
    - `platform` string: Platform name (e.g., "Discord", "Telegram")
    - `country` string: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (e.g., "GB", "US", "SE") for geo-localised helpline data. Falls back to user profile country if omitted.
    - `prior_messages` object[]: Prior turns of this conversation, oldest first, submitted by you for this request only -- Tuteliq stores no message content, so nothing here is retained after the call completes. Use this when you already have the whole conversation in hand; use continuation_token instead when you are calling once per new message as it arrives.
      - `role` string, required: Role of the sender (e.g., "user", "contact", "adult", "child")
      - `text` string, required: Message text
      - `timestamp` string: ISO 8601 timestamp of the message (optional)
    - `conversation_history` object[]: Deprecated: use prior_messages instead (same shape, same behavior). Kept for backward compatibility.
      - `role` string, required: Role of the sender (e.g., "user", "contact", "adult", "child")
      - `text` string, required: Message text
      - `timestamp` string: ISO 8601 timestamp of the message (optional)
    - `author_role` 'subject' | 'responder': Who wrote the `text` being analysed, relative to the distress. "subject" = the person whose wellbeing is in question (the help-seeker, child, or user). "responder" = someone supporting or assessing them (a crisis counsellor, teacher, parent, social worker). Optional; when set, the response echoes `distress_subject` so a reviewer knows which party the detected signals belong to. Does NOT change severity or recommended_action -- a responder's question inside a genuine crisis is still a genuine crisis.
  - `options` object
    - `include_evidence` boolean: Include evidence excerpts in response. Default: true.
    - `support_threshold` 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Minimum severity level to include crisis support resources. Defaults to "high". Note: "critical" severity always includes support resources regardless of this setting.
    - `verdict_only` boolean: Fast mode: omit the per-message `message_analysis` array from the response. All other fields are unchanged. Cuts output length (and therefore latency) significantly on multi-turn input.
  - `support_threshold` 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Top-level alias for options.support_threshold. Minimum severity to show crisis support resources (default: high). Critical always shows.
  - `include_evidence` boolean: Top-level alias for options.include_evidence. When false, the `evidence` array is omitted from the response. Default: true.
  - `continuation_token` string: Opaque, signed token returned by a previous call to this endpoint. Pass it back here to continue the analysis with prior context — no need to re-send prior_messages. The token IS the state; we store nothing.
  - `reset_conversation` boolean: When true, discard any continuation_token and treat this call as the first turn of a new conversation.
  - `message_id` string: Optional customer-side identifier for this turn. If provided, evidence pointers in the continuation_token will reference this id so you can map detections back to your own messages. If omitted we use a deterministic short hash of the text.
  - `bypass_cache` boolean: Deprecated, no effect: results are never cached — every request runs a fresh evaluation and nothing derived from the input is stored. The field is still accepted so existing integrations do not break.
  - `external_id` string: Your unique identifier (e.g. message ID, content ID) for correlating Tuteliq results with your own system. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads so you can match alerts to the original content.
  - `customer_id` string: Your end-customer identifier for multi-tenant / B2B2C scenarios. If you serve multiple customers (schools, apps, brands) from a single API key, set this to route webhook alerts to the correct customer. Echoed back in the response and included in webhook payloads as "customerId".
  - `metadata` object: Arbitrary key-value pairs for additional context (e.g. { "channel": "discord", "region": "eu" }). Stored with the detection result, echoed in the response, and included in webhook payloads. Maximum 20 properties.
  - `incident_moderation_enabled` boolean: Per-call override of your account incident logging setting. When set, it takes precedence for THIS request: true forces the incident to be persisted, false suppresses persistence. Omit to use your account default (which itself defaults to enabled). Useful to suppress logging for test traffic or to opt specific calls in or out.

## Response `200`

Default Response

- object
  - `declared_age_overridden` boolean: True when the caller declared an adult age group but the speaker states a minor age in the message or in the earlier turns sent with it. The declared age was not used. Nothing is escalated by this on its own; the analysis runs as if no age had been sent. Worth investigating at your end: an age check that disagrees with what the user says is what a bypassed age verification looks like. A stated ADULT age never has this effect. Absent unless it applied.
  - `declared_age_overridden_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when declared_age_overridden is true.
  - `urgency_kept` boolean: True when a declared `context.conversation_type` would have capped an urgent action to `flag_for_review` and did not, because the case is acute: the analysis named an acute marker, or a separate reading found a person at risk now with something happening as the text is written. A reading that gave no answer also keeps the urgency. Absent otherwise, and never present together with `conversation_type_applied`.
  - `urgency_kept_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when urgency_kept is true.
  - `conversation_type_applied` string: Present only when a caller-declared `context.conversation_type` actually changed routing. Confirms the setting was taken into account, rather than leaving the platform to assume it was.
  - `absence_reason_cleared` boolean: romance-scam only. Present when a detection was cleared because the reason given for not appearing on video or in person was a passing obstacle (a router down, out of data, an early start) rather than a standing property of the claimed persona (a deployment, a rig, a clearance), and the only tactics were IDENTITY_FABRICATION / SECRECY_REQUEST / URGENCY_PRESSURE. Before this, an ordinary "no wifi until Thursday" message was told its sender was fabricating an identity (#224). Absent when the gate did not fire.
  - `past_account_cleared` boolean: romance-scam only. Present when a result that asked for no action was not reported as a detection, because a separate reading found the message is an account of something that is over, or is about nobody in particular (a warning, a lesson, a story about a relative years ago). Never present when the analysis asked for monitoring or review.
  - `unseen_partner_raised` boolean: Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a romantic relationship with someone met online and never met in person; that person has never been seen on video or gives a reason they cannot be seen or checked; talk of love, marriage or keeping it private. The result is raised to `flag_for_review`. This pattern is complete before any money is asked for.
  - `unseen_partner_raised_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when unseen_partner_raised is true.
  - `love_bombing_raised` boolean: Romance scam only. True when the analysis left the result below review and a separate reading found all of: a declaration of lifelong or exclusive devotion to the reader; the message itself showing that the two barely know each other or have not met; and nothing of a shared life in it. The result is raised to review, never higher. This is how a romance scam opens, before anything is asked for, and it can also be sincere, so a moderator decides. Absent otherwise. ADVISORY: for a moderator UI and triage queues. Branch production logic on `recommended_action`.
  - `love_bombing_raised_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when love_bombing_raised is true.
  - `ordinary_shared_finances_capped` boolean: Romance scam only. True when, across a whole conversation (earlier turns submitted, or a conversation pasted into `text`), a separate reading found that money moves the way it does between people who share a life (a cost split, a sum covered and paid back, a shared expense), with no unmet or unverifiable partner, unusual payment method, crisis, secrecy or promised returns. A result at review or block is then brought down to `monitor`. Only `recommended_action` changes; `detected`, the categories, the level and the score are as the analysis gave them. Never applied to a single message, a declared minor, a kept urgency, or a result another reading cleared or raised. Absent otherwise.
  - `ordinary_shared_finances_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when ordinary_shared_finances_capped is true.
  - `protective_speech_capped` boolean: True when an alert was lowered because a separate reading found a text that works AGAINST the harm it describes: explaining it, warning about it, counselling or supporting someone, reporting it or asking what to do. Two outcomes: with nobody at risk in the text and the detector itself reading the speaker as describing someone else, the result is nothing detected at `monitor`; with a person at risk and a responsible adult in the text already acting, an urgent action becomes `flag_for_review` and the finding is kept. A text that does the harm, a person at risk with nobody acting, anything happening as the text is written, and any failed reading are never lowered. Absent when not applied.
  - `protective_speech_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation, naming which of the two outcomes applied. Present only when protective_speech_capped is true.
  - `endpoint` string: The detection endpoint that produced this result
  - `detected` boolean: A signal was observed at ANY severity (including low / monitor cases). For production branching prefer `recommended_action` (`flag_for_moderator` / `immediate_intervention` indicate action required).
  - `severity` number: Severity score (0.0-1.0)
  - `confidence` number: Model confidence in the classification (0.0-1.0)
  - `risk_score` number: Age-adjusted risk score (0.0-1.0)
  - `level` 'none' | 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical': Human-readable severity level
  - `categories` object[]: Detected categories with confidence scores
    - `tag` string: Category identifier (e.g., "URGENCY_FABRICATION")
    - `label` string: Human-readable category label
    - `confidence` number: Confidence for this category (0.0-1.0)
  - `evidence` object[]: Evidence excerpts supporting the detection
    - `text` string: Evidence excerpt from the input
    - `tactic` string: The tactic or indicator this evidence relates to
    - `weight` number: Evidence weight (0.0-1.0)
  - `age_calibration` object
    - `applied` boolean
    - `age_group` string
    - `multiplier` number
  - `recommended_action` string: Recommended action to take
  - `rationale` string: Explanation of the detection result
  - `message_analysis` object[]: Per-message risk breakdown (only present when prior_messages is provided)
    - `message_index` number: Index of the message in the conversation history (1-based)
    - `risk_score` number: Risk score for this individual message (0.0-1.0)
    - `flags` string[]: Tactics or indicators detected in this message
    - `summary` string: Brief explanation of this message's risk contribution
  - `language` string: Language code used for analysis
  - `language_status` 'stable' | 'beta': Language support maturity
  - `credits_used` number: Credits consumed by this request
  - `processing_time_ms` number: Processing time in milliseconds
  - `continuation_token` string: Opaque, signed token carrying derived analysis state. Pass it back on the next call to continue the conversation without re-sending history. Server stores nothing — the token IS the state.
  - `continuation_expires_at` string: ISO 8601 timestamp at which the continuation_token expires (24h default).
  - `state_source` 'token' | 'fresh' | 'reset': How the prior analysis state was sourced for this call: "token" (decoded from continuation_token), "fresh" (no prior state), "reset" (reset_conversation forced a fresh start).
  - `external_id` string: Echo of the external_id you provided in the request
  - `customer_id` string: Echo of the customer_id you provided in the request
  - `metadata` object: Echo of the metadata you provided in the request
  - `support` object: Country-specific crisis helplines and response guidance (only for high/critical severity)
    - `country` string
    - `country_name` string
    - `emergency_number` string
    - `helplines` object[]
      - `name` string
      - `number` string
      - `description` string
      - `category` string
      - `available` string
    - `response_guide` object
      - `category` string
      - `immediateActions` string[]
      - `resources` object[]
        - `name` string
        - `description` string
        - `url` string
  - `distress_reading` 'literal_present' | 'about_other' | 'past_resolved' | 'figurative' | 'quoted' | 'none': How the words are being used, from a separate reading taken when the verdict would otherwise alert. `literal_present` = someone is expressing their own present distress and means it. `about_other` = the distress belongs to someone who is not speaking (a friend, a relative, a professional describing or responding to it). `past_resolved` = the speaker describes distress they have come through. `figurative` = exaggeration, idiom or a joke about something ordinary ("this homework is killing me", "kill me now" about a game). `quoted` = a lyric, a quotation, fiction, news or teaching material. `none` = nothing about distress. Absent when no reading was taken.
  - `reading_capped` boolean: True when `recommended_action` was lowered because `distress_reading` was `figurative`, `quoted`, `past_resolved` or `none`: `flag_for_review` is lowered to `monitor`, and `block` and `immediate_intervention` are lowered to `flag_for_review` and no further, so a case routed above review is still seen by a person. `detected`, `severity`, `level` and `risk_score` are NOT changed, and the case always stays visible. Never applied when the reading is `literal_present` or `about_other`, or when no reading could be taken. Absent when it did not apply.
  - `reading_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when reading_capped is true.
  - `ordinary_day_capped` boolean: True when a `flag_for_review` was lowered to `monitor` because the message mentions an ordinary part of life and nothing more (parents arguing, giving up a hobby, a secret that is good or ordinary news). It applies only when every pattern named is family conflict, withdrawal or trust seeking, the action is review and no higher, there are no earlier turns in play, and a second separate reading found nothing more than an everyday matter and nobody else acting on the writer. `detected`, the categories, the severity and the score are unchanged. It never clears to `none`. Absent unless it applied.
  - `ordinary_day_capped_reason` string: Human-readable explanation. Present only when ordinary_day_capped is true.
  - `support_suggested` boolean: True when the analysis suggested a supportive check-in and nothing more: a low mood being met with comfort, for example. `recommended_action` is `monitor` in that case, so nothing here asks a moderator to act; a product that offers wellbeing prompts can use this field to offer one. It is never present beside `flag_for_review` or an urgent action, and it changes nothing else in the result. Absent otherwise.
  - `distress_subject` 'speaker' | 'other_party': WHOSE distress the detected signals describe. "speaker" = the author of the analysed message is expressing their own distress. "other_party" = the author is supporting or assessing someone else who is in distress. Derived DETERMINISTICALLY from the `context.author_role` you supply -- not inferred by the model -- and omitted entirely when you do not supply it. Attribution only: this never changes severity or recommended_action.

## Changes

- **2026-10-19** `8490332e0031`: 1 info
  - endpoint added

[Operation history](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/changes/api/v1/safety/distress-signals/post.md)

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/tuteliq/apis/tuteliq-api/revisions/8490332e0031?raw)