---
title: "Scrub Preview"
method: POST
path: "/memory/scrub-preview"
---

# Scrub Preview

`POST /memory/scrub-preview`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://api-docs.session-exchange.com` (the document declares no server; this is the origin it was published from)
- URL: `https://api-docs.session-exchange.com/memory/scrub-preview`
- Auth: none declared

Dry-run the sanitizer WITHOUT publishing or storing anything. Body:
    {text}                        — scan arbitrary text, or
    {kind, id, version?=staging}  — scan a STORED item's markdown (collection walks members).
Returns {findings:[{type,count}], clean, preview (redacted, capped), files?}.

AUTH IS PER-MODE, deliberately. The `{text}` mode is the pre-upload check a brand-new user
needs BEFORE they have anything to publish: it reads no stored data, writes nothing, and
returns only what the sanitizer found. Gating it behind publish rights — as it was until
2026-09-22 — meant the one built-in tool for inspecting a transcript before sending it was
unreachable by exactly the people about to send their first one (measured: 403 for a
signed-in user with no tenant, 401 anonymous). Sign-in is still required, because scrubbing
is CPU-heavy and an anonymous caller could burn the box for free.

The `{kind, id}` mode still requires publish rights: it READS stored items out of a tenant,
which is a different question from "scan this text I already have".

This endpoint is a BACKSTOP, not the control. Responsibility for what leaves a machine sits
with the client: the sanitizer only knows secret SHAPES (sk_/ghp_/whsec_ and friends) and
cannot know that a hostname, a customer name, or an unreleased product is sensitive to you.
Use it to catch what you missed, never as the reason you did not look.

## Response `200`

Successful Response

- unknown

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/session-exchange/apis/a4sx.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/session-exchange/apis/a4sx/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/session-exchange/apis/a4sx/revisions/abaefc33dfc7?raw)