---
title: "Re-send the one-time code for an in-progress email two-factor challenge."
method: POST
path: "/api/v1/tokens/two-factor/resend"
tags: ["Public"]
---

# Re-send the one-time code for an in-progress email two-factor challenge.

`POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor/resend`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://go.outseta.com`
- URL: `https://go.outseta.com/api/v1/tokens/two-factor/resend`
- Auth: none declared

Post the challenge token from the original `POST /api/v1/tokens` response:
            
    { "challenge_token": "eyJ..." }
            
A fresh code is emailed and a new challenge is returned (superseding
the previous one), in the same shape as the `202` from
`POST /api/v1/tokens` minus `two_factor_required`. Only `Email`
challenges can be resent — there is nothing to resend for `Totp`
(the authenticator app generates codes locally), so a `Totp`
challenge returns `400` with a body of `not_supported`. Rate limited
to 3 requests per minute (`429`).

## Query parameters

- `data` unknown, required

## Response `200`

A new code was sent; the replacement challenge is returned.

- TwoFactorChallengePayload: Returned when a login cannot complete with a password alone because the user has two-factor authentication enabled. Carries the opaque challenge token that must be echoed back to POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor (or the recovery / resend / switch-mechanism endpoints) along with enough metadata for a client to render the verification step without a second round-trip. The property names are snake_case to match the wire format of the other token endpoints (see TokenPayload).
  - `two_factor_required` boolean, nullable: Present and true on the 202 response from POST /api/v1/tokens when the user has at least one verified 2FA method. Absent on the resend / switch-mechanism responses, which only ever follow an already-issued login challenge.
  - `two_factor_enrollment_required` boolean, nullable: Present and true instead of two_factor_required when the tenant forces 2FA but the user has not yet enrolled any method. In that case only challenge_token and expires_in are populated and the client must route the user through the mid-login enrollment endpoints (/api/v1/tokens/two-factor/enroll/...) before a token can be issued.
  - `challenge_token` string, nullable: Short-lived signed JWT (audience outseta:2fa-challenge) that identifies this challenge. Echo it back verbatim to complete the login.
  - `mechanism` string, nullable: The mechanism this challenge was issued against: Email or Totp (authenticator app). For Email a code has already been sent to the user; for Totp the user reads the current code from their authenticator app and nothing is sent.
  - `masked_destination` string, nullable: A masked view of where an emailed code was sent (e.g. b***@outseta.com), suitable for display. Empty when mechanism is Totp.
  - `expires_in` integer: Seconds until the challenge expires (600). After this the challenge_token can no longer be verified and the login must restart.
  - `available_mechanisms` string[], nullable: Every verified mechanism enrolled for this user (excluding recovery codes), e.g. ["Totp", "Email"]. A client can offer a "use a different method" option for any value other than the current mechanism via POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor/switch-mechanism.
  - `recovery_codes_available` boolean, nullable: true when the user has a batch of recovery codes on file, in which case POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor/recovery can be used as a fallback if they cannot produce a primary code.

## Other responses

- `400`: Resend is not supported for this mechanism (`not_supported`).
- `410`: The challenge expired (`challenge_expired`); restart the login.

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/outseta/apis/outseta-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/outseta/apis/outseta-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/outseta/apis/outseta-api/revisions/c362823af82d?raw)