---
title: "Batch token risk scoring (up to 50 mints)"
method: POST
path: "/tokens/batch/risk"
tags: ["Tokens"]
---

# Batch token risk scoring (up to 50 mints)

`POST /tokens/batch/risk`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://madeonsol.com/api/v1`
- URL: `https://madeonsol.com/api/v1/tokens/batch/risk`
- Auth: HTTP bearer

Same loader and per-mint shape as `GET /tokens/{mint}/risk` (score v2, assessment, dev block, coverage) for up to 50 mints — identical evidence gives identical scores. Documented difference: no live dev-holdings RPC per mint, so `dev.holdings_*` are null and `dev.transfer_status` is `unknown` (the dev block never moves the score). Untracked mints come back as `{ mint, error: "not_tracked" }`, and mints whose score-critical inputs could not be read as `{ mint, error: "unavailable", retryable: true }` — never a partial score. PRO+.

## Request body

- object
  - `mints` string[], required

## Response `200`

OK

- object
  - `coverage` LaunchCoverage: Dataset-scope disclosure injected on every 200 from the launch-pipeline feeds (`/deployer-hunter/*`, `/sniper/*`, `/alpha/*`, `/tokens/almost-bonded`, `/tokens/batch/risk`, `/wallet/batch/classify`) unless the route already carries a more precise per-subject `coverage`. Static: these datasets are built from launchpad ingest (in practice ~99% pump.fun), so an absent wallet/token, an empty profile or a `false` reputation flag means 'not observed by this pipeline', never 'clean' or 'no activity'.
    - `scope` string
    - `note` string: How to read absences and zeros in this response.
  - `tokens` object[]
    - `mint` string
    - `risk_score` integer
    - `band` 'safe' | 'caution' | 'danger': Never `safe` while assessment.status is `incomplete`, or with an un-revoked mint/freeze authority
    - `score_version` 'v2': v2 (2026-09-21): a token-supply burn no longer earns the LP-burn credit (v1: burn_detected=true → 0, every other token → 8; v2: every token without verified LP evidence → 8, burned or not — no burn penalty); unknown transfer fee is warn(4) not "No transfer fee"; deployer reputation scores only an established history; unknown inputs keep the band off `safe`.
    - `factors` object[]
      - `key` string
      - `label` string
      - `status` 'ok' | 'warn' | 'danger' | 'unknown' | 'not_assessed': ok/warn/danger = evidence read and scored. unknown = the input should exist but could not be read or is insufficient (0 points; listed in assessment.unknown_inputs; band never safe). not_assessed = no evidence source applies to this token (0 points; listed in assessment.not_assessed). Neither is ever positive evidence.
      - `points` integer
      - `detail` string
    - `inputs` object: Every scorer input. Enrichment fields are null when unobserved — unknown, not false/0.
      - `mint_authority_revoked` boolean, nullable
      - `freeze_authority_revoked` boolean, nullable
      - `liquidity_usd` number, nullable
      - `liquidity_to_mc_ratio` number, nullable
      - `transfer_fee_bps` integer, nullable
      - `is_token_2022` boolean, nullable
      - `token_supply_burn_detected` boolean, nullable: The mint's supply decreased (token burn). Not LP evidence.
      - `burn_detected` boolean, nullable: DEPRECATED alias of token_supply_burn_detected
      - `lp_burn_status` 'verified' | 'not_verified' | 'unknown': LP burn/lock evidence: `verified` only with measured LP-token custody (lp_burnt_pct ≥ 99). No Solana writer populates LP custody yet, so today every token is `unknown`. A token-supply burn is never promoted to an LP claim.
      - `launch_cohort_sol` number, nullable
      - `launch_cohort_size` integer, nullable
      - `sniper_footprint` object, nullable
      - `deployer_bonding_rate` number, nullable
      - `deployer_total_deployed` integer, nullable
      - `deployer_history_status` 'new_in_our_index' | 'limited_history' | 'reputation_pending' | 'established' | 'null', nullable: null when there is no deployer
      - `deployer_reputation_scored` boolean: Whether the bonding rate moved the score (established history only)
      - `liquidity_observed_at` string, date-time, nullable: When the liquidity figure was last observed (mc-tracker last trade). With the creator not assessed, band safe requires this within the last 6 h (null or more than 5 min in the future = not fresh). 6 h is a policy threshold, not proof that the liquidity is still there.
      - `kol_signal` string, nullable
      - `is_blacklisted` boolean, nullable
      - `supply_inflation_pct` number, nullable
    - `assessment` object
      - `status` 'complete' | 'incomplete': incomplete = at least one score input is unknown; the score is a lower bound
      - `unknown_inputs` string[]: Inputs not observed for this token (e.g. transfer_fee, mint_authority, liquidity, kol_activity, deployer_reputation, blacklist, supply_inflation, launch_cohort). deployer_reputation is unknown when a creator lookup failed, when a LAUNCHPAD mint's creator was not recorded (a coverage gap), or when a known creator has no established history.
      - `explanations` object: Why each unknown / not-assessed input is listed, keyed by input name, plus band_cap when the band was capped (creator not assessed and liquidity / liquidity-to-MC not both ok, or the liquidity figure older than 6 h — a policy threshold, not proof of safety). Missing required creator information never yields band safe, for any token.
      - `not_assessed` string[]: Dimensions not measured for this token that are NOT a failed lookup: lp_custody (never observed for Solana pools) and deployer_reputation only when the token has no launchpad origin in our capture (no deploy row, no bonding-curve pool, not PumpSwap-primary, no pump/bonk/BAGS vanity suffix). A launchpad mint with an unrecorded creator, or a failed origin lookup, is an unknown input instead.
    - `dev_status` 'ok' | 'not_found' | 'unavailable': ok = dev block present · not_found = no pending_deploys row (not a launchpad deploy we saw) · unavailable = the lookup failed
    - `dev` object, nullable: Dev-wallet activity (migration 225). Trade-derived fields are accurate THROUGH activity_rollup_through; holdings are observed at holdings_observed_at — never at as_of.
      - `wallet` string, nullable
      - `launchpad` string, nullable
      - `deployed_at` string, date-time, nullable
      - `buy_sol` number, nullable
      - `buy_tokens` number, nullable
      - `buy_supply_pct` number, nullable
      - `bought_tokens_after` number, nullable
      - `sold_tokens` number, nullable
      - `sold_sol` number, nullable
      - `first_sell_at` string, date-time, nullable
      - `last_sell_at` string, date-time, nullable
      - `holdings_tokens` number, nullable: Live on-chain balance (60 s cache); null = RPC unavailable or not checked (batch)
      - `holdings_supply_pct` number, nullable
      - `wallet_empty` boolean, nullable
      - `holdings_observed_at` string, date-time, nullable: When the RPC balance was observed (cache fetch time)
      - `activity_rollup_through` string, date-time, nullable: Dev trades are rolled up through this time (dev_activity cursor)
      - `activity_rollup_ran_at` string, date-time, nullable
      - `expected_tokens_from_trades` number, nullable: Balance the dev's own recorded trades explain, aligned to holdings_observed_at
      - `transfer_status` 'none_detected' | 'suspected' | 'unknown': suspected = balance below what recorded trades explain (a sell on an uncaptured venue looks identical) — never a verified transfer; unknown = observations misaligned, rollup stale, no coverage, or holdings not checked
      - `transfer_reason` string
      - `transferred_out` boolean, nullable: DEPRECATED boolean view of transfer_status: true = suspected, false = none_detected, null = unknown
    - `coverage` TradeCoverage: Coverage disclosure for endpoints backed by our persisted trade capture (`token_trades` / early-buyer data). Capture starts 2026-04-12 and persistence is gated to the launchpad pipeline (pump.fun, LaunchLab/bonk, bags) — it is NOT a full Solana trade history. Three separate answers (2026-09-21): `data_observed`/`in_scope` = at least one persisted row (presence, not completeness — a brand-new in-scope mint with no trades yet also reads false), `eligibility` = whether the CURRENT gate admits the subject, `completeness` = always `not_verified`. When no rows exist, zero/empty values mean 'not captured' (see eligibility for why), never 'no activity'.
      - `history_start` integer: Epoch seconds of the first persisted trade (2026-04-12).
      - `scope` string
      - `in_scope` boolean, nullable: Kept for compatibility — same value as data_observed: true = we hold ≥1 persisted trade for this subject · false = none persisted (see eligibility for why — a brand-new in-scope mint also reads false) · null = probe unavailable
      - `data_observed` boolean, nullable
      - `eligibility` 'eligible' | 'lapsed' | 'excluded' | 'unknown' | 'admitted_previously' | 'not_applicable' | 'null', nullable: Resolved against the EFFECTIVE production capture settings (refreshed every few minutes; if they cannot be confirmed the answer narrows, never widens). eligible = admitted by the current gate · lapsed = launched via our pipeline, capture window closed under the current settings · excluded = blacklisted · unknown = no evidence the gate admits it (most likely outside the launchpad pipeline; basis capture_state_unavailable = settings could not be confirmed, no claim either way) · admitted_previously = persisted rows prove past admission, current status not established · not_applicable = wallet subjects · null = lookup failed
      - `eligibility_basis` string, nullable: Evidence behind eligibility (e.g. unresolved_launch, recently_bonded, revived_curve, pipeline_known, launchlab_pool, bags_vanity_mint, launchpad_proven, resolved_launch, bonded_over_7d, revival_expired, blacklisted, persisted_rows, capture_state_unavailable, lookup_failed)
      - `completeness` 'not_verified'
      - `size_floor` object: Persistence size floor of the same write path (added 2026-09-30). Buys under 0.05 SOL (under $3.50 when paid in USDC/USDT) are not stored; sells that receive SOL are kept at any size. Live streams, prices and candles are not subject to it.
        - `min_sol` number
        - `min_stable_usd` number
        - `applies_to` string
      - `note` string: How to read the values (always present since 2026-09-21: eligibility-specific when no rows exist, a completeness caveat when they do).
    - `as_of` string, date-time: Response time — not the observation time of any input
    - `error` 'not_tracked' | 'unavailable' | 'error': Present instead of a score: not_tracked = no snapshot data; unavailable = a score-critical input could not be read (retryable: true, unavailable_inputs lists them) — never a partial score; error = the per-mint compute failed (retryable when it was a statement timeout)
    - `code` 'risk_inputs_unavailable'
    - `unavailable_inputs` string[]
    - `retryable` boolean
  - `count` integer

## Other responses

- `400`: Invalid body
- `401`: Missing or invalid API key, or an expired free-tier key. Authentication-stage error: no `X-RateLimit-*` headers, no `_rid`.
- `403`: Forbidden. One of: the key's tier is below this endpoint's or parameter's gate (`tier_required` with an `upgrade` block); the public demo key used outside its allow-list (`demo_key_endpoint_not_allowed`); an invalid or revoked key; an origin-restricted key called from a disallowed origin (`code` `origin_not_allowed` / `origin_required`). `X-RateLimit-*` headers are present only on `tier_required`.
- `429`: Too many requests. Every 429 carries `Retry-After`. A quota 429 (`rate_limit_exceeded`, with `X-RateLimit-*`), a heavy-query concurrency 429 (`error_kind` `concurrency`/`capacity`), or the per-IP authentication-failure block (30 failed auths/min; plain `error` + `retry_after_seconds`, no `X-RateLimit-*`).
- `500`: Unexpected server error from the route (`Internal server error`, with `_rid`). Safe to retry with backoff. A failed API-key lookup is a 503 `auth_backend_unavailable`, never a 500.
- `503`: The API-key or subscription lookup could not be answered (authentication stage). Retryable and not your fault: it is never counted as a failed authentication. Honour `Retry-After`; no `X-RateLimit-*`, no `_rid`.

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api/revisions/96ce84657f55?raw)
