---
title: "Token risk / safety score"
method: GET
path: "/tokens/{mint}/risk"
tags: ["Tokens"]
---

# Token risk / safety score

`GET /tokens/{mint}/risk`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://madeonsol.com/api/v1`
- URL: `https://madeonsol.com/api/v1/tokens/{mint}/risk`
- Auth: HTTP bearer

Transparent 0–100 rug-risk score (higher = riskier) with a per-factor breakdown — mint/freeze authority, liquidity depth & thinness, Token-2022 transfer fee, LP burn, bundled/sniped open, deployer track record, KOL distribution, supply inflation (on-chain supply grown above expected = stealth-mint/dilution), and blacklist. Composed from the same data layer as `GET /token/{mint}` (no extra latency). Returns `band` (safe/caution/danger), `factors[]` (each with `status` + `points` + `detail`), and the raw `inputs` (including `supply_inflation_pct` and `sniper_footprint`). The top-level `dev` block (nullable) is the deployer self-activity read: create-tx self-buy (`buy_sol`/`buy_tokens`/`buy_supply_pct`), post-create own-mint trading (`bought_tokens_after`, `sold_tokens`, `sold_sol`, `first_sell_at`/`last_sell_at`), and live on-chain holdings (`holdings_tokens`, `holdings_supply_pct`, `wallet_empty`), each with its own observation time (`holdings_observed_at`, `activity_rollup_through`), plus `transfer_status` (`none_detected` | `suspected` | `unknown`): a balance below what the dev's own recorded trades explain is only ever SUSPECTED (a sell on an uncaptured venue looks identical), and misaligned or missing observations are `unknown`; `transferred_out` is its deprecated boolean view. Carries `score_version` (now `v2`) and `as_of` (response time — not an observation time).

**Score v2 (2026-09-21):** the LP factor no longer credits a token-SUPPLY burn (mc-tracker's burn flag) — LP custody is not observed for Solana pools, so `lp_burn` is warn/8 with `inputs.lp_burn_status: unknown` unless verified LP evidence exists; an unknown transfer fee is warn/4, not "No transfer fee"; deployer reputation scores only an established history. `assessment` says whether every input was observed: `incomplete` lists `unknown_inputs` and the band is never `safe`; a failed lookup of a score-critical input is a retryable 503 (`code: risk_inputs_unavailable`), never a score computed without it. **Same loader on every transport:** `POST /tokens/batch/risk` and x402 return identical scores for identical evidence; batch skips only the live dev-holdings RPC (`dev.holdings_*` null, `transfer_status: unknown`). The `coverage` object (shared TradeCoverage shape) discloses whether the mint sits inside the launchpad trade capture, with a note naming which sub-fields are trade-derived (cohort/sniper/bundle factors, dev sell rollup) vs pure on-chain reads (authorities, liquidity, live holdings) that are unaffected. PRO+.

## Path parameters

- `mint` string, required

## Response `200`

OK

- object
  - `resolved_from` object: Present only when the path address was a liquidity pool that we resolved to its token mint (2026-09-05). Absent otherwise.
    - `address` string: The pool address you sent.
    - `kind` 'pool'
    - `dex` string
    - `source` 'token_pools' | 'chain': How the pool was resolved: from our pool index, or decoded live on-chain (PumpSwap).
  - `mint` string: The mint scored. Equals the path value unless the path was a PumpSwap pool address, in which case this is the pool's resolved mint and `resolved_from` is set.
  - `risk_score` integer
  - `band` 'safe' | 'caution' | 'danger': Never `safe` while assessment.status is `incomplete`, or with an un-revoked mint/freeze authority
  - `score_version` 'v2': v2 (2026-09-21): a token-supply burn no longer earns the LP-burn credit (v1: burn_detected=true → 0, every other token → 8; v2: every token without verified LP evidence → 8, burned or not — no burn penalty); unknown transfer fee is warn(4) not "No transfer fee"; deployer reputation scores only an established history; unknown inputs keep the band off `safe`.
  - `factors` object[]
    - `key` string
    - `label` string
    - `status` 'ok' | 'warn' | 'danger' | 'unknown' | 'not_assessed': ok/warn/danger = evidence read and scored. unknown = the input should exist but could not be read or is insufficient (0 points; listed in assessment.unknown_inputs; band never safe). not_assessed = no evidence source applies to this token (0 points; listed in assessment.not_assessed). Neither is ever positive evidence.
    - `points` integer
    - `detail` string
  - `inputs` object: Every scorer input. Enrichment fields are null when unobserved — unknown, not false/0.
    - `mint_authority_revoked` boolean, nullable
    - `freeze_authority_revoked` boolean, nullable
    - `liquidity_usd` number, nullable
    - `liquidity_to_mc_ratio` number, nullable
    - `transfer_fee_bps` integer, nullable
    - `is_token_2022` boolean, nullable
    - `token_supply_burn_detected` boolean, nullable: The mint's supply decreased (token burn). Not LP evidence.
    - `burn_detected` boolean, nullable: DEPRECATED alias of token_supply_burn_detected
    - `lp_burn_status` 'verified' | 'not_verified' | 'unknown': LP burn/lock evidence: `verified` only with measured LP-token custody (lp_burnt_pct ≥ 99). No Solana writer populates LP custody yet, so today every token is `unknown`. A token-supply burn is never promoted to an LP claim.
    - `launch_cohort_sol` number, nullable
    - `launch_cohort_size` integer, nullable
    - `sniper_footprint` object, nullable
    - `deployer_bonding_rate` number, nullable
    - `deployer_total_deployed` integer, nullable
    - `deployer_history_status` 'new_in_our_index' | 'limited_history' | 'reputation_pending' | 'established' | 'null', nullable: null when there is no deployer
    - `deployer_reputation_scored` boolean: Whether the bonding rate moved the score (established history only)
    - `liquidity_observed_at` string, date-time, nullable: When the liquidity figure was last observed (mc-tracker last trade). With the creator not assessed, band safe requires this within the last 6 h (null or more than 5 min in the future = not fresh). 6 h is a policy threshold, not proof that the liquidity is still there.
    - `kol_signal` string, nullable
    - `is_blacklisted` boolean, nullable
    - `supply_inflation_pct` number, nullable
  - `assessment` object
    - `status` 'complete' | 'incomplete': incomplete = at least one score input is unknown; the score is a lower bound
    - `unknown_inputs` string[]: Inputs not observed for this token (e.g. transfer_fee, mint_authority, liquidity, kol_activity, deployer_reputation, blacklist, supply_inflation, launch_cohort). deployer_reputation is unknown when a creator lookup failed, when a LAUNCHPAD mint's creator was not recorded (a coverage gap), or when a known creator has no established history.
    - `explanations` object: Why each unknown / not-assessed input is listed, keyed by input name, plus band_cap when the band was capped (creator not assessed and liquidity / liquidity-to-MC not both ok, or the liquidity figure older than 6 h — a policy threshold, not proof of safety). Missing required creator information never yields band safe, for any token.
    - `not_assessed` string[]: Dimensions not measured for this token that are NOT a failed lookup: lp_custody (never observed for Solana pools) and deployer_reputation only when the token has no launchpad origin in our capture (no deploy row, no bonding-curve pool, not PumpSwap-primary, no pump/bonk/BAGS vanity suffix). A launchpad mint with an unrecorded creator, or a failed origin lookup, is an unknown input instead.
  - `dev_status` 'ok' | 'not_found' | 'unavailable': ok = dev block present · not_found = no pending_deploys row (not a launchpad deploy we saw) · unavailable = the lookup failed
  - `dev` object, nullable: Dev-wallet activity (migration 225). Trade-derived fields are accurate THROUGH activity_rollup_through; holdings are observed at holdings_observed_at — never at as_of.
    - `wallet` string, nullable
    - `launchpad` string, nullable
    - `deployed_at` string, date-time, nullable
    - `buy_sol` number, nullable
    - `buy_tokens` number, nullable
    - `buy_supply_pct` number, nullable
    - `bought_tokens_after` number, nullable
    - `sold_tokens` number, nullable
    - `sold_sol` number, nullable
    - `first_sell_at` string, date-time, nullable
    - `last_sell_at` string, date-time, nullable
    - `holdings_tokens` number, nullable: Live on-chain balance (60 s cache); null = RPC unavailable or not checked (batch)
    - `holdings_supply_pct` number, nullable
    - `wallet_empty` boolean, nullable
    - `holdings_observed_at` string, date-time, nullable: When the RPC balance was observed (cache fetch time)
    - `activity_rollup_through` string, date-time, nullable: Dev trades are rolled up through this time (dev_activity cursor)
    - `activity_rollup_ran_at` string, date-time, nullable
    - `expected_tokens_from_trades` number, nullable: Balance the dev's own recorded trades explain, aligned to holdings_observed_at
    - `transfer_status` 'none_detected' | 'suspected' | 'unknown': suspected = balance below what recorded trades explain (a sell on an uncaptured venue looks identical) — never a verified transfer; unknown = observations misaligned, rollup stale, no coverage, or holdings not checked
    - `transfer_reason` string
    - `transferred_out` boolean, nullable: DEPRECATED boolean view of transfer_status: true = suspected, false = none_detected, null = unknown
  - `coverage` TradeCoverage: Coverage disclosure for endpoints backed by our persisted trade capture (`token_trades` / early-buyer data). Capture starts 2026-04-12 and persistence is gated to the launchpad pipeline (pump.fun, LaunchLab/bonk, bags) — it is NOT a full Solana trade history. Three separate answers (2026-09-21): `data_observed`/`in_scope` = at least one persisted row (presence, not completeness — a brand-new in-scope mint with no trades yet also reads false), `eligibility` = whether the CURRENT gate admits the subject, `completeness` = always `not_verified`. When no rows exist, zero/empty values mean 'not captured' (see eligibility for why), never 'no activity'.
    - `history_start` integer: Epoch seconds of the first persisted trade (2026-04-12).
    - `scope` string
    - `in_scope` boolean, nullable: Kept for compatibility — same value as data_observed: true = we hold ≥1 persisted trade for this subject · false = none persisted (see eligibility for why — a brand-new in-scope mint also reads false) · null = probe unavailable
    - `data_observed` boolean, nullable
    - `eligibility` 'eligible' | 'lapsed' | 'excluded' | 'unknown' | 'admitted_previously' | 'not_applicable' | 'null', nullable: Resolved against the EFFECTIVE production capture settings (refreshed every few minutes; if they cannot be confirmed the answer narrows, never widens). eligible = admitted by the current gate · lapsed = launched via our pipeline, capture window closed under the current settings · excluded = blacklisted · unknown = no evidence the gate admits it (most likely outside the launchpad pipeline; basis capture_state_unavailable = settings could not be confirmed, no claim either way) · admitted_previously = persisted rows prove past admission, current status not established · not_applicable = wallet subjects · null = lookup failed
    - `eligibility_basis` string, nullable: Evidence behind eligibility (e.g. unresolved_launch, recently_bonded, revived_curve, pipeline_known, launchlab_pool, bags_vanity_mint, launchpad_proven, resolved_launch, bonded_over_7d, revival_expired, blacklisted, persisted_rows, capture_state_unavailable, lookup_failed)
    - `completeness` 'not_verified'
    - `size_floor` object: Persistence size floor of the same write path (added 2026-09-30). Buys under 0.05 SOL (under $3.50 when paid in USDC/USDT) are not stored; sells that receive SOL are kept at any size. Live streams, prices and candles are not subject to it.
      - `min_sol` number
      - `min_stable_usd` number
      - `applies_to` string
    - `note` string: How to read the values (always present since 2026-09-21: eligibility-specific when no rows exist, a completeness caveat when they do).
  - `as_of` string, date-time: Response time — not the observation time of any input

## Other responses

- `400`: The address is valid base58 but is not a token mint. `code` says what it is: `wallet_not_mint` (a system-owned account — wallet intel lives at /wallet/{address}, KOL routes at /kol/{wallet}; `hint` carries both), `token_account_not_mint` (a holder's token account; `mint` + `risk_url` point at the right mint when it can be read), `pool_not_mint` (a Raydium / Meteora / Orca pool we could not resolve; `dex` names it — pass the pool's base mint). Also `evm_address_on_solana_route` for a 0x address (`rhc_endpoint` names the Robinhood Chain twin) and `mint_lowercased` for a mint that lost its case.
- `401`: Missing or invalid API key, or an expired free-tier key. Authentication-stage error: no `X-RateLimit-*` headers, no `_rid`.
- `403`: Forbidden. One of: the key's tier is below this endpoint's or parameter's gate (`tier_required` with an `upgrade` block); the public demo key used outside its allow-list (`demo_key_endpoint_not_allowed`); an invalid or revoked key; an origin-restricted key called from a disallowed origin (`code` `origin_not_allowed` / `origin_required`). `X-RateLimit-*` headers are present only on `tier_required`.
- `404`: `code: not_tracked` — a real mint that has never traded in our capture (carries `resolved_from` + `mint` when the path was a pool we resolved), or `code: not_on_chain` — no account with this address exists on Solana mainnet (checked live), i.e. not a coverage gap on our side.
- `429`: Too many requests. Every 429 carries `Retry-After`. A quota 429 (`rate_limit_exceeded`, with `X-RateLimit-*`), a heavy-query concurrency 429 (`error_kind` `concurrency`/`capacity`), or the per-IP authentication-failure block (30 failed auths/min; plain `error` + `retry_after_seconds`, no `X-RateLimit-*`).
- `500`: Unexpected server error from the route (`Internal server error`, with `_rid`). Safe to retry with backoff. A failed API-key lookup is a 503 `auth_backend_unavailable`, never a 500.
- `503`: A score-critical input (token_prices, blacklist, supply drift, snapshot) could not be read. Retry after `Retry-After`; no score is returned rather than one computed without it. Body: `{ error, code: "risk_inputs_unavailable", unavailable_inputs: string[], retryable: true, retry_after_seconds }`. Distinct from a missing row, which is scored as an unknown input.

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/madeonsol/apis/madeonsol-api/revisions/96ce84657f55?raw)