---
title: "List active webhook subscriptions"
method: GET
path: "/api/v1/subscriptions"
tags: ["Subscriptions"]
---

# List active webhook subscriptions

`GET /api/v1/subscriptions`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://www.apier.no`
- URL: `https://www.apier.no/api/v1/subscriptions`
- Auth: HTTP bearer

Lists active subscriptions for the calling consumer. Secret material (hash AND ciphertext) is never returned in any form — only metadata. Inactive subscriptions are not included.

## Query parameters

- `limit` integer

## Response `200`

All active subscriptions belonging to the caller. Not paginated — the per-consumer cap of 10 ensures the response always fits in one page.

- object
  - `success` true, required
  - `data` SubscriptionListResponse, required: GET /v1/subscriptions response payload (the `data` field of the standard envelope). Returns active subscriptions belonging to the calling consumer, ordered by created_at DESC. Not paginated: the per-consumer active-subscription cap is 10, so the response always fits in one page.
    - `data` SubscriptionRecord[], required: All active subscriptions for this consumer. Capped at the per-consumer limit of 10 active subscriptions, so this array is always exhaustive — no follow-up page request is needed.
      - `id` string, uuid, required: Subscription row identifier — stable for the subscription's lifetime; survives soft-delete (active=false) so the FK to webhook_deliveries (append-only) stays intact for forensic queries.
      - `webhook_url` string, uri, required: The URL Apier POSTs deliveries to. Validated at create time AND at every delivery against the SSRF blocklist (private CIDRs, .local / .internal suffixes, metadata endpoints, IPv4-mapped IPv6, trailing-dot FQDN spellings). HTTPS-only in production.
      - `filter` SubscriptionFilter, required: Change-detection webhook subscription filter. Closed key set with implicit AND across keys: a delivery fires only when EVERY present field equals the corresponding column on the change-archive row. No wildcard support today. At least one key required; an empty object is rejected at the route boundary.
        - `source` 'brreg' | 'altinn' | 'digdir' | 'norges_bank' | 'nav' | 'skatteetaten': Match the upstream data source (Brønnøysund / Altinn / DigDir / Norges Bank / NAV Aa-registeret / Skatteetaten Tier 2). Same enum the /v1/changes query endpoint uses; CHANGE_SOURCES is the canonical source-of-truth.
        - `entity_type` string: Match the source-specific entity type (e.g. `company` for brreg, `schema` for altinn, `policy` for digdir, `exchange_rate` for norges_bank, `company_tier2` for nav and skatteetaten). Use `annual_accounts` with source `brreg` to subscribe to the accounts.updated event — annual-accounts filing-status changes from the open Regnskapsregisteret tier. Length-capped to keep the GIN filter index tight.
        - `entity_id` string: Match a specific entity id (e.g. an org_number for brreg, a schema_id for altinn). 256-char cap prevents a malicious filter from bloating the GIN index with a long string.
        - `change_type` 'created' | 'updated' | 'deleted': Match the RFC-6902-ish change classification. `created` and `deleted` rows carry full snapshots; `updated` rows are split one-per-changed-field with a JSON Pointer in `field_path`.
      - `active` boolean, required: False after a soft-delete via DELETE /v1/subscriptions/{id}, after the consecutive-4xx auto-disable threshold, or after admin revocation. Inactive subscriptions are excluded from GET listings; only the lifecycle-history columns (deactivated_at, deactivation_reason) and the webhook_deliveries FK survive.
      - `webhook_secret_enc_key_version` integer, required: Encryption key version under which the secret ciphertext is stored. v1 today (reads `WEBHOOK_SECRET_ENC_KEY` env). A future rotation is additive — adding `WEBHOOK_SECRET_ENC_KEY_V2` env + a one-line key-version dispatcher — without altering existing rows.
      - `created_at` string, date-time, required: RFC 3339 timestamp when the subscription was created. Stable; never updated by lifecycle changes (use `updated_at` if you need to track soft-delete time, exposed via the audit log).
  - `_meta` TrustMetadata, required: Metadata included in every response for trust and verifiability.
    - `rulebook_version` string, required: Current Rulebook version. Internal rule-version records carry structured origin metadata (`initial_seed` | `human_review` | `lovdata_drift_response` | `audit_finding` | `customer_question` | `legal_correction`) for operator forensics, but that attribution is deliberately NOT exposed on public responses to avoid leaking operational signal.
    - `data_freshness` string, date-time, required: When this data was last fetched (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `last_verified` string, date-time, required: When this data was last verified against source (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `source` string, required: Origin of this data. Defaults to `apier.no`. The agent-readiness probe (`GET /api/v1/health/agent-readiness`) is the one surface that may instead emit `apier.no telemetry` — it does so when at least one of its endpoint rates came from measured live telemetry, and falls back to `apier.no` when every rate is a static default; all other endpoints always emit `apier.no`.
    - `data_source` string: Authoritative origin of the underlying data (listed alongside rulebook_version, data_freshness, last_verified, legal_basis for Rulebook-influenced endpoints). Distinct from `source` (the response origin): `data_source` identifies the authoritative data publisher — e.g. 'Brønnøysund Enhetsregisteret + Apier Universal Rulebook'. Present on registry-backed endpoints.
    - `served_from` 'cache' | 'live' | 'static': Cache-aware endpoints only — 'cache' when the response was served from the local copy, 'live' when the gateway just refreshed from the upstream, 'static' when the payload was computed deterministically from pure code with no DB or upstream read (e.g. /v1/public/deadlines). Absent on endpoints that don't carry this semantic.
    - `stale` boolean: Cache-aware endpoints only — true when the upstream was unreachable and a within-limit cached row was served as a fallback. Absent on normal responses.
    - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the time of the response; matches `info.version`. Always present on every `/v1/*` response so a future schema break can be traced to the exact rows / audit events that predate / postdate it. Agent-facing machine interfaces (v1/capabilities, workflows.json) may override with their own narrower surface version; all other endpoints inherit the manifest-level version.
    - `legal_basis` string: Legal basis under which the response data is reused. Present on Rulebook-influenced endpoints (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /v1/company/{org}/deadlines). Common value: 'NLOD — public registry reuse'.
    - `rule_count` integer: Rule-evaluation count — total rules evaluated for this request. Present on endpoints that invoke the Rulebook evaluator (v1/company/{org}/obligations).
    - `applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `not_applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'not_applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `insufficient_data_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'insufficient_data' (Tier 2 gated). Present on evaluator endpoints. rule_count = applicable_count + not_applicable_count + insufficient_data_count.
    - `cache_age_ms` integer, nullable: Cache layer: milliseconds since the cached row was computed, or null on a cache miss (served_from === 'live'). Agents use it alongside data_freshness as a staleness signal. Present on endpoints wired to the cache (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /deadlines, /summary, /v1/public/obligations, /v1/public/deadlines).
    - `response_time_ms` integer: Speed signal: total server-side processing time in milliseconds, measured via performance.now() at the route boundary. Mirrored on the `X-Apier-Response-Time-Ms` header so agents can key on it without parsing the body. Present on every endpoint.
    - `response_timestamp` string, date-time: RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 UTC timestamp stamped by the response builder at wire-exit. Mirrored on the `provenance_log.response_timestamp` column by a fire-and-forget writer. Distinct from `data_freshness` (when upstream data was fetched) and `last_verified` (when the citation was verified); this is the moment the envelope left the server. Always populated at runtime — deliberately left out of the `required` list to avoid a cascading contract change that would invalidate every pre-existing example envelope in this spec (append-only response contracts). A future revision may promote it into the `required` list alongside a bulk example refresh.
    - `response_hash` string: SHA-256 hash of the canonical-JSON form of the envelope with `_meta` stripped before hashing, prefixed with `sha256:`. Mirrored on `provenance_log.response_hash` so a consumer can independently re-hash the bytes they received and compare against what we persisted (integrity receipt). Stripping `_meta` is load-bearing: volatile fields (response_time_ms, cache_age_ms, served_from) and the hash itself would otherwise feed into the digest and break the cache-hit-bytewise-identical invariant.
    - `source_snapshot_id` string: Optional free-text pointer into an upstream sync snapshot the response derives from — e.g. a Brreg sync's `brreg-<ISO>` snapshot id. Absent when the response is not tied to a specific upstream snapshot (capabilities, tools, static deadlines).
    - `is_sandbox` true: Present and `true` only when the response was generated from sandbox fixture data (currently `ALTINN_MODE=sandbox` on `/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity`). Absent (NOT `false`) on every other response — the absent-vs-false distinction is deliberate so downstream agents branching on `if (response._meta.is_sandbox)` cannot be misled into treating non-sandbox responses as positively-confirmed-not-sandbox. Distinct from the `/v1/sandbox/*` `is_sandbox: true` literal in `SandboxMeta` (which carries the sandbox surface tag); this flag rides through the production `/api/v1/altinn/*` surface to forensically tag a sandbox-mode response that an OEM evaluator received.
    - `cost_nok` number: What this call debited from the caller's prepaid credit balance, in NOK, rendered from the integer-øre ledger (50 øre → 0.5; the ledger itself never leaves whole øre and no float arithmetic touches a balance). Present on the 2xx body of every metered company-data read — the same debit that sets the `X-Credits-Cost-Ore` header, so the two never disagree. `0` when nothing was charged: credit enforcement running dark (the response then also carries `X-Credit-Check: shadow`) or the sandbox surface. Absent on unmetered endpoints and on error envelopes — a refunded 5xx/403/404 claims no cost rather than a wrong one. Lives under `_meta`, which `response_hash` excludes, so the provenance receipt is unaffected; the route's ETag is computed before the credit wrapper stamps it, so a conditional request can still short-circuit to 304. Append-only addition.
    - `wallet_remaining_nok` number, nullable: The prepaid credit balance remaining AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; mirrors the `X-Credits-Balance-Ore` header). `null` when no balance was read: credit enforcement running dark, or the sandbox surface. Present wherever `cost_nok` is. An agent planning a sequence of metered calls can divide this by the per-call price from GET /api/v1/pricing to know how many reads remain before a 402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS. Append-only addition.
    - `spend_cap_remaining_nok` number: What the calling key may still spend under its tighter spend cap (Europe/Oslo calendar day or month) AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; never below 0). Present on the 2xx body of a metered read only when credit enforcement is live AND the key has a daily or monthly cap (set with PATCH /api/v1/account/keys/{id}); absent otherwise. When it reaches 0 the next metered call on this key returns 402 SPEND_CAP_REACHED until the cap resets. Append-only addition.

## Other responses

- `400`: Validation failed — `limit` query parameter outside allowed range (1-200), or other parameter validation error.
- `401`: Authentication failed — missing, malformed, invalid, or revoked API key.
- `403`: API key lacks `subscribe:webhooks` scope.
- `429`: Rate limit reached on at least one of TWO independent dimensions running in parallel: per-(api_key, endpoint) per-minute (the established per-tier scaling — Free / Starter / Professional / Enterprise unlimited) AND per-(api_key, org_number) per-day (bounds runaway-agent failure modes per client org so one org's traffic cannot starve siblings sharing the same key; daily bucket window is one calendar day in Europe/Oslo, DST-aware). The `X-RateLimit-Dimension` header identifies which bucket tripped: `per_key`, `per_org`, or `both` (when the same request exceeds both — the binding Retry-After is the per-org value because the per-org window is hours/days vs the per-minute window). The `Retry-After` header indicates how many seconds to wait before the binding window resets; `X-RateLimit-Limit` / `X-RateLimit-Remaining` / `X-RateLimit-Reset` describe the per-minute bucket state. The per-day per-org limits per tier (sized at ~100× typical daily volume — the dimension exists to bound failure modes, not to monetize) are: Free 1000/org/day, Starter 5000, Professional 25000, Enterprise unlimited. On rare infrastructure-side failures the gateway fails OPEN and passes the request through with `X-RateLimit-Check: skipped` on the response — clients can treat that as a transient signal that quota enforcement was briefly degraded.
- `500`: Subscription listing failed — `SUBSCRIPTION_LIST_FAILED`. Unexpected Supabase / RPC failure; body follows the structured ApiError envelope.

---

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