---
title: "Bulk company status for up to 100 organisation numbers"
method: GET
path: "/api/v1/public/company-status"
tags: ["Public"]
---

# Bulk company status for up to 100 organisation numbers

`GET /api/v1/public/company-status`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://www.apier.no`
- URL: `https://www.apier.no/api/v1/public/company-status`
- Auth: none required

Zero-auth, cacheable Category A batch endpoint. Takes a comma-separated list of up to 100 Norwegian organisation numbers and returns one status row per unique number: registry status, entity type, VAT registration, the raw Brønnøysund distress flags (konkurs, under avvikling, under tvangsavvikling), municipality, NACE codes, and the open Regnskapsregisteret annual-accounts filing status. Nobody else in Norway offers keyless bulk company status — brreg.no and commercial lookups are single-company — which is WHY this exists: a portfolio of companies or an agent's watch-list resolves in one call instead of a hundred.

PERSONAL-DATA BOUNDARY (the load-bearing design constraint): this surface is anonymous, so it serves Tier-1 NON-PERSONAL fields ONLY, selected through an explicit server-side allowlist. Role-holder data — signaturrett, prokura, board members, innehaver, any named natural person — is structurally absent and will never be added to this endpoint; those fields require an authenticated, per-key rate-limited Category B call (GET /api/v1/company/{org}/context or /authority). If you need signing authority in bulk, iterate the authenticated endpoint with your API key.

Per-row fault isolation: one organisation failing never fails the batch. Each row carries `lookup_status` — `ok` (data present), `not_found` (authoritative Brønnøysund 404), or `unavailable` (upstream unreachable or timed out) — so a partial result is still a useful result. Lookups run with bounded concurrency and a per-organisation timeout server-side; requesting 100 numbers is safe.

Input rules (strict, no silent fallbacks): every token must be a 9-digit organisation number passing the Brønnøysund MOD-11 control-digit check (internal whitespace like `123 456 785` is tolerated); any malformed token, an empty list, or more than 100 entries returns 400 VALIDATION_FAILED naming the offending values. Duplicates are collapsed — each unique number appears exactly once, in request order.

Tri-state semantics: `mva_registered`, the distress flags, and `has_filed_annual_accounts` are true / false / null where `null` means genuinely unknown (the registry omitted the field or the cached row predates it) — never coerced to false.

Caching: responses carry a strong SHA-256 ETag and honour If-None-Match with 304 Not Modified; Cache-Control is `public, max-age=300`. `_meta.data_freshness` is the MAX cache timestamp across the resolved rows, so the response is deterministic for a given registry-cache state (same input + same data = same bytes = same ETag).

Rate limiting: soft per-IP cap of 1000 requests per minute (Category A — discovery is never hard-blocked). Exceeding returns 429 with the standard `RateLimitExceeded` response.

## Query parameters

- `org_numbers` string, required

## Response `200`

One row per unique requested organisation number, in request order. Rows with `lookup_status` of `not_found` or `unavailable` carry `company: null` — the batch never fails because one organisation did.

- object
  - `success` true, required
  - `data` object, required
    - `companies` object[], required: One row per unique requested organisation number, in request order.
      - `org_number` string, required: The requested 9-digit organisation number this row answers for — present on every row, including failures, so the caller can join rows back to their input.
      - `lookup_status` 'ok' | 'not_found' | 'unavailable', required: Per-row outcome. `ok` = data present. `not_found` = Brønnøysund authoritatively reports no such organisation. `unavailable` = the registry was unreachable or the lookup timed out — retry later; the rest of the batch is unaffected.
      - `company` object, nullable, required: Tier-1 non-personal status snapshot; null unless `lookup_status` is `ok`. Deliberately contains NO role-holder fields (signaturrett / prokura / board members / innehaver) — those require an authenticated Category B call.
        - `org_number` string, required: 9-digit organisation number.
        - `name` string, required: Registered company name from Enhetsregisteret.
        - `entity_type` string, required: Norwegian entity-type code (AS, ENK, ANS, DA, NUF, ...).
        - `status` string, required: Collapsed registry status, e.g. ACTIVE or DELETED.
        - `registration_date` string, nullable, required: Enhetsregisteret registration date (YYYY-MM-DD), or null when the registry omits it.
        - `mva_registered` boolean, nullable, required: VAT (MVA) registration status. Tri-state: true / false / null = unknown — never coerced.
        - `konkurs` boolean, nullable, required: Bankruptcy flag, raw from Brønnøysund. Tri-state; null = unknown.
        - `under_avvikling` boolean, nullable, required: Voluntary-dissolution flag. Tri-state; null = unknown.
        - `under_tvangsavvikling` boolean, nullable, required: Forced-dissolution flag. Tri-state; null = unknown.
        - `municipality` string, nullable, required: Business-address municipality, or null when not registered.
        - `nace_codes` string[], required: NACE industry codes from Enhetsregisteret.
        - `has_filed_annual_accounts` boolean, nullable, required: Whether the open Regnskapsregisteret tier shows at least one annual-accounts filing. Tri-state; null = unknown (the cached row has not had a regnskap-fetching refresh).
        - `last_accounts_year` integer, nullable, required: Calendar year of the most recent annual-accounts record, or null when none / unknown.
  - `_meta` TrustMetadata, required: Metadata included in every response for trust and verifiability.
    - `rulebook_version` string, required: Current Rulebook version. Internal rule-version records carry structured origin metadata (`initial_seed` | `human_review` | `lovdata_drift_response` | `audit_finding` | `customer_question` | `legal_correction`) for operator forensics, but that attribution is deliberately NOT exposed on public responses to avoid leaking operational signal.
    - `data_freshness` string, date-time, required: When this data was last fetched (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `last_verified` string, date-time, required: When this data was last verified against source (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `source` string, required: Origin of this data. Defaults to `apier.no`. The agent-readiness probe (`GET /api/v1/health/agent-readiness`) is the one surface that may instead emit `apier.no telemetry` — it does so when at least one of its endpoint rates came from measured live telemetry, and falls back to `apier.no` when every rate is a static default; all other endpoints always emit `apier.no`.
    - `data_source` string: Authoritative origin of the underlying data (listed alongside rulebook_version, data_freshness, last_verified, legal_basis for Rulebook-influenced endpoints). Distinct from `source` (the response origin): `data_source` identifies the authoritative data publisher — e.g. 'Brønnøysund Enhetsregisteret + Apier Universal Rulebook'. Present on registry-backed endpoints.
    - `served_from` 'cache' | 'live' | 'static': Cache-aware endpoints only — 'cache' when the response was served from the local copy, 'live' when the gateway just refreshed from the upstream, 'static' when the payload was computed deterministically from pure code with no DB or upstream read (e.g. /v1/public/deadlines). Absent on endpoints that don't carry this semantic.
    - `stale` boolean: Cache-aware endpoints only — true when the upstream was unreachable and a within-limit cached row was served as a fallback. Absent on normal responses.
    - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the time of the response; matches `info.version`. Always present on every `/v1/*` response so a future schema break can be traced to the exact rows / audit events that predate / postdate it. Agent-facing machine interfaces (v1/capabilities, workflows.json) may override with their own narrower surface version; all other endpoints inherit the manifest-level version.
    - `legal_basis` string: Legal basis under which the response data is reused. Present on Rulebook-influenced endpoints (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /v1/company/{org}/deadlines). Common value: 'NLOD — public registry reuse'.
    - `rule_count` integer: Rule-evaluation count — total rules evaluated for this request. Present on endpoints that invoke the Rulebook evaluator (v1/company/{org}/obligations).
    - `applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `not_applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'not_applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `insufficient_data_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'insufficient_data' (Tier 2 gated). Present on evaluator endpoints. rule_count = applicable_count + not_applicable_count + insufficient_data_count.
    - `cache_age_ms` integer, nullable: Cache layer: milliseconds since the cached row was computed, or null on a cache miss (served_from === 'live'). Agents use it alongside data_freshness as a staleness signal. Present on endpoints wired to the cache (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /deadlines, /summary, /v1/public/obligations, /v1/public/deadlines).
    - `response_time_ms` integer: Speed signal: total server-side processing time in milliseconds, measured via performance.now() at the route boundary. Mirrored on the `X-Apier-Response-Time-Ms` header so agents can key on it without parsing the body. Present on every endpoint.
    - `response_timestamp` string, date-time: RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 UTC timestamp stamped by the response builder at wire-exit. Mirrored on the `provenance_log.response_timestamp` column by a fire-and-forget writer. Distinct from `data_freshness` (when upstream data was fetched) and `last_verified` (when the citation was verified); this is the moment the envelope left the server. Always populated at runtime — deliberately left out of the `required` list to avoid a cascading contract change that would invalidate every pre-existing example envelope in this spec (append-only response contracts). A future revision may promote it into the `required` list alongside a bulk example refresh.
    - `response_hash` string: SHA-256 hash of the canonical-JSON form of the envelope with `_meta` stripped before hashing, prefixed with `sha256:`. Mirrored on `provenance_log.response_hash` so a consumer can independently re-hash the bytes they received and compare against what we persisted (integrity receipt). Stripping `_meta` is load-bearing: volatile fields (response_time_ms, cache_age_ms, served_from) and the hash itself would otherwise feed into the digest and break the cache-hit-bytewise-identical invariant.
    - `source_snapshot_id` string: Optional free-text pointer into an upstream sync snapshot the response derives from — e.g. a Brreg sync's `brreg-<ISO>` snapshot id. Absent when the response is not tied to a specific upstream snapshot (capabilities, tools, static deadlines).
    - `is_sandbox` true: Present and `true` only when the response was generated from sandbox fixture data (currently `ALTINN_MODE=sandbox` on `/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity`). Absent (NOT `false`) on every other response — the absent-vs-false distinction is deliberate so downstream agents branching on `if (response._meta.is_sandbox)` cannot be misled into treating non-sandbox responses as positively-confirmed-not-sandbox. Distinct from the `/v1/sandbox/*` `is_sandbox: true` literal in `SandboxMeta` (which carries the sandbox surface tag); this flag rides through the production `/api/v1/altinn/*` surface to forensically tag a sandbox-mode response that an OEM evaluator received.
    - `cost_nok` number: What this call debited from the caller's prepaid credit balance, in NOK, rendered from the integer-øre ledger (50 øre → 0.5; the ledger itself never leaves whole øre and no float arithmetic touches a balance). Present on the 2xx body of every metered company-data read — the same debit that sets the `X-Credits-Cost-Ore` header, so the two never disagree. `0` when nothing was charged: credit enforcement running dark (the response then also carries `X-Credit-Check: shadow`) or the sandbox surface. Absent on unmetered endpoints and on error envelopes — a refunded 5xx/403/404 claims no cost rather than a wrong one. Lives under `_meta`, which `response_hash` excludes, so the provenance receipt is unaffected; the route's ETag is computed before the credit wrapper stamps it, so a conditional request can still short-circuit to 304. Append-only addition.
    - `wallet_remaining_nok` number, nullable: The prepaid credit balance remaining AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; mirrors the `X-Credits-Balance-Ore` header). `null` when no balance was read: credit enforcement running dark, or the sandbox surface. Present wherever `cost_nok` is. An agent planning a sequence of metered calls can divide this by the per-call price from GET /api/v1/pricing to know how many reads remain before a 402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS. Append-only addition.
    - `spend_cap_remaining_nok` number: What the calling key may still spend under its tighter spend cap (Europe/Oslo calendar day or month) AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; never below 0). Present on the 2xx body of a metered read only when credit enforcement is live AND the key has a daily or monthly cap (set with PATCH /api/v1/account/keys/{id}); absent otherwise. When it reaches 0 the next metered call on this key returns 402 SPEND_CAP_REACHED until the cap resets. Append-only addition.

## Other responses

- `400`: Missing `org_numbers`, a token that is not a valid 9-digit MOD-11 organisation number, or more than 100 entries. The `explanation.details` array names every offending value — nothing is silently dropped.
- `429`: Per-minute rate limit reached for this (IP, endpoint) bucket on a zero-auth public endpoint. The `Retry-After` header indicates how many seconds to wait before the window resets. Public endpoints share a single soft-cap of 1000 requests per minute PER IP — there is no tier scaling, because callers aren't authenticated. Every allowed response also carries the standard `X-RateLimit-*` headers. On rare infrastructure-side failures the gateway fails OPEN and passes the request through with `X-RateLimit-Check: skipped`.

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/revisions/9ec19bc87311?raw)