--- title: "Resolve actor capacity for a person on behalf of an organisation" method: POST path: "/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity" tags: ["Altinn"] --- # Resolve actor capacity for a person on behalf of an organisation `POST /api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity` ## Request - Base URL: `https://www.apier.no` - URL: `https://www.apier.no/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity` - Auth: HTTP bearer Given an 11-digit Norwegian fødselsnummer or D-nummer (`fnr`) and a 9-digit organisasjonsnummer (`org_number`), returns every Altinn role the actor currently holds for that organisation plus the derived action tokens those roles legally permit. The lookup hashes the raw fnr with HMAC-SHA-256(fnr, RECEIPT_HMAC_SECRET) at the boundary; the raw value NEVER lands in the response, the audit log, the cache row, or any persisted column — only the 64-hex `fnr_hmac` echoes back. Roles are normalised through (DAGL Daglig leder, LEDE Styreleder, MEDL Styremedlem, NESTL Nestleder, INNH Innehaver, REGN Regnskapsfører, REVI Revisor at v1 — every entry's role-code is verified against the Altinn role catalogue, and every per-action `legal_reference` carries a verified lovdata.no citation as of (2026-05-16) — DAGL/LEDE/MEDL/NESTL → aksjeloven, INNH → skatteforvaltningsloven, REGN → regnskapsførerloven, REVI → revisorloven; the `derived_actions[*].verification_pending` boolean stays on the contract for forward-compat with any future un-verified seed (post-2026-05-16 it is `false` for every production row)). The fail-closed behavior for unverified `legal_reference` placeholders IS wired (the resolver's `failClosedOnUnverified` branch) but currently unreachable: `ALTINN_MODE=live` throws `Altinn live mode not yet wired` so the live path never reaches the resolver at v1. When ships the live Altinn integration, the path activates: roles still appear in `roles[]` so the agent sees what Altinn reported, but no unverified derived_action propagates to live consumers. Results are cached in `resolved_permissions` with a hard 1-hour TTL ceiling enforced by a DB CHECK constraint; `data.cached === true` indicates a cache hit and the response was served without re-hitting Altinn. Required scope: `read:altinn`. The MCP tool `list_acting_capacity` proxies through this endpoint via the registry pattern — REST and MCP callers share one source of truth. ## Request body - object - `fnr` string, required: 11-digit Norwegian fødselsnummer or D-nummer. HMAC-SHA-256 hashed at the boundary; never persisted in plaintext. - `org_number` string, required: 9-digit Norwegian organisasjonsnummer the actor wishes to represent. ## Response `200` Actor capacity resolved. The response wraps the flat data shape under `data` (the standard /api/v1/* `{ success, data, _meta }` shape; the MCP executor builds the agent envelope from this verbatim, so returning a pre-wrapped envelope here would double-wrap on the MCP path — see). - object - `success` true, required - `data` object, required: Flat data shape. The MCP executor extracts this verbatim and wraps it in the agent envelope on its side; returning a pre-wrapped `{ result, justification, metadata }` here would double-wrap on the MCP path. - `actor` object, required - `fnr_hmac` string, required: 64-char lowercase hex HMAC-SHA-256 of the input fnr. PSEUDONYMOUS — NOT anonymous: the hash is stable per (raw fnr, server pepper) pair, so two requests for the same actor produce the same `fnr_hmac` and a third party who later learns the pepper could re-identify. Treat as personal-data-adjacent: store only when necessary (audit chains, forensic joins), never log to a third-party telemetry service, prefer correlation_id for client-side tracing. - `on_behalf_of` object, required - `org_number` string, required - `name` string, nullable, required - `roles` object[], required - `code` string, required - `label_nb` string, required - `valid_from` string, date-time, required - `valid_to` string, date-time, nullable, required - `derived_actions` object[], required - `action` string, required - `via_role_code` string, required - `legal_reference` string, required: Lovdata.no citation. Every production row carries a verified citation as of (2026-05-16). The TBD-VERIFY-LOVDATA literal is retained as a runtime sentinel for any future un-verified seed (defense-in-depth) — when `verification_pending` is true the value is the sentinel literal, but no production row currently triggers this. - `verification_pending` boolean, required: True when `legal_reference` is the TBD placeholder. Agents should treat the legal citation as provisional in that case. - `source_snapshot_id` string, required: Opaque upstream snapshot identifier — propagated into actor_delegations.source_snapshot_id. - `role_count` integer, required - `fetched_at` string, date-time, required - `cached` boolean, required: True when the answer came from resolved_permissions cache; false for cold misses. - `correlation_id` string, uuid, required: Echoes the request's correlation_id; same value appears on the X-Correlation-ID response header. - `_meta` TrustMetadata, required: Metadata included in every response for trust and verifiability. - `rulebook_version` string, required: Current Rulebook version. Internal rule-version records carry structured origin metadata (`initial_seed` | `human_review` | `lovdata_drift_response` | `audit_finding` | `customer_question` | `legal_correction`) for operator forensics, but that attribution is deliberately NOT exposed on public responses to avoid leaking operational signal. - `data_freshness` string, date-time, required: When this data was last fetched (ISO 8601 UTC). - `last_verified` string, date-time, required: When this data was last verified against source (ISO 8601 UTC). - `source` string, required: Origin of this data. Defaults to `apier.no`. The agent-readiness probe (`GET /api/v1/health/agent-readiness`) is the one surface that may instead emit `apier.no telemetry` — it does so when at least one of its endpoint rates came from measured live telemetry, and falls back to `apier.no` when every rate is a static default; all other endpoints always emit `apier.no`. - `data_source` string: Authoritative origin of the underlying data (listed alongside rulebook_version, data_freshness, last_verified, legal_basis for Rulebook-influenced endpoints). Distinct from `source` (the response origin): `data_source` identifies the authoritative data publisher — e.g. 'Brønnøysund Enhetsregisteret + Apier Universal Rulebook'. Present on registry-backed endpoints. - `served_from` 'cache' | 'live' | 'static': Cache-aware endpoints only — 'cache' when the response was served from the local copy, 'live' when the gateway just refreshed from the upstream, 'static' when the payload was computed deterministically from pure code with no DB or upstream read (e.g. /v1/public/deadlines). Absent on endpoints that don't carry this semantic. - `stale` boolean: Cache-aware endpoints only — true when the upstream was unreachable and a within-limit cached row was served as a fallback. Absent on normal responses. - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the time of the response; matches `info.version`. Always present on every `/v1/*` response so a future schema break can be traced to the exact rows / audit events that predate / postdate it. Agent-facing machine interfaces (v1/capabilities, workflows.json) may override with their own narrower surface version; all other endpoints inherit the manifest-level version. - `legal_basis` string: Legal basis under which the response data is reused. Present on Rulebook-influenced endpoints (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /v1/company/{org}/deadlines). Common value: 'NLOD — public registry reuse'. - `rule_count` integer: Rule-evaluation count — total rules evaluated for this request. Present on endpoints that invoke the Rulebook evaluator (v1/company/{org}/obligations). - `applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints. - `not_applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'not_applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints. - `insufficient_data_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'insufficient_data' (Tier 2 gated). Present on evaluator endpoints. rule_count = applicable_count + not_applicable_count + insufficient_data_count. - `cache_age_ms` integer, nullable: Cache layer: milliseconds since the cached row was computed, or null on a cache miss (served_from === 'live'). Agents use it alongside data_freshness as a staleness signal. Present on endpoints wired to the cache (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /deadlines, /summary, /v1/public/obligations, /v1/public/deadlines). - `response_time_ms` integer: Speed signal: total server-side processing time in milliseconds, measured via performance.now() at the route boundary. Mirrored on the `X-Apier-Response-Time-Ms` header so agents can key on it without parsing the body. Present on every endpoint. - `response_timestamp` string, date-time: RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 UTC timestamp stamped by the response builder at wire-exit. Mirrored on the `provenance_log.response_timestamp` column by a fire-and-forget writer. Distinct from `data_freshness` (when upstream data was fetched) and `last_verified` (when the citation was verified); this is the moment the envelope left the server. Always populated at runtime — deliberately left out of the `required` list to avoid a cascading contract change that would invalidate every pre-existing example envelope in this spec (append-only response contracts). A future revision may promote it into the `required` list alongside a bulk example refresh. - `response_hash` string: SHA-256 hash of the canonical-JSON form of the envelope with `_meta` stripped before hashing, prefixed with `sha256:`. Mirrored on `provenance_log.response_hash` so a consumer can independently re-hash the bytes they received and compare against what we persisted (integrity receipt). Stripping `_meta` is load-bearing: volatile fields (response_time_ms, cache_age_ms, served_from) and the hash itself would otherwise feed into the digest and break the cache-hit-bytewise-identical invariant. - `source_snapshot_id` string: Optional free-text pointer into an upstream sync snapshot the response derives from — e.g. a Brreg sync's `brreg-` snapshot id. Absent when the response is not tied to a specific upstream snapshot (capabilities, tools, static deadlines). - `is_sandbox` true: Present and `true` only when the response was generated from sandbox fixture data (currently `ALTINN_MODE=sandbox` on `/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity`). Absent (NOT `false`) on every other response — the absent-vs-false distinction is deliberate so downstream agents branching on `if (response._meta.is_sandbox)` cannot be misled into treating non-sandbox responses as positively-confirmed-not-sandbox. Distinct from the `/v1/sandbox/*` `is_sandbox: true` literal in `SandboxMeta` (which carries the sandbox surface tag); this flag rides through the production `/api/v1/altinn/*` surface to forensically tag a sandbox-mode response that an OEM evaluator received. - `cost_nok` number: What this call debited from the caller's prepaid credit balance, in NOK, rendered from the integer-øre ledger (50 øre → 0.5; the ledger itself never leaves whole øre and no float arithmetic touches a balance). Present on the 2xx body of every metered company-data read — the same debit that sets the `X-Credits-Cost-Ore` header, so the two never disagree. `0` when nothing was charged: credit enforcement running dark (the response then also carries `X-Credit-Check: shadow`) or the sandbox surface. Absent on unmetered endpoints and on error envelopes — a refunded 5xx/403/404 claims no cost rather than a wrong one. Lives under `_meta`, which `response_hash` excludes, so the provenance receipt is unaffected; the route's ETag is computed before the credit wrapper stamps it, so a conditional request can still short-circuit to 304. Append-only addition. - `wallet_remaining_nok` number, nullable: The prepaid credit balance remaining AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; mirrors the `X-Credits-Balance-Ore` header). `null` when no balance was read: credit enforcement running dark, or the sandbox surface. Present wherever `cost_nok` is. An agent planning a sequence of metered calls can divide this by the per-call price from GET /api/v1/pricing to know how many reads remain before a 402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS. Append-only addition. - `spend_cap_remaining_nok` number: What the calling key may still spend under its tighter spend cap (Europe/Oslo calendar day or month) AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; never below 0). Present on the 2xx body of a metered read only when credit enforcement is live AND the key has a daily or monthly cap (set with PATCH /api/v1/account/keys/{id}); absent otherwise. When it reaches 0 the next metered call on this key returns 402 SPEND_CAP_REACHED until the cap resets. Append-only addition. ## Other responses - `400`: Validation failed — fnr must be 11 digits, org_number must be 9 digits, no extra fields permitted. - `401`: Authentication failed. - `403`: Scope insufficient — `read:altinn` is required. - `429`: Rate limit reached on at least one of TWO independent dimensions running in parallel: per-(api_key, endpoint) per-minute (the established per-tier scaling — Free / Starter / Professional / Enterprise unlimited) AND per-(api_key, org_number) per-day (bounds runaway-agent failure modes per client org so one org's traffic cannot starve siblings sharing the same key; daily bucket window is one calendar day in Europe/Oslo, DST-aware). The `X-RateLimit-Dimension` header identifies which bucket tripped: `per_key`, `per_org`, or `both` (when the same request exceeds both — the binding Retry-After is the per-org value because the per-org window is hours/days vs the per-minute window). The `Retry-After` header indicates how many seconds to wait before the binding window resets; `X-RateLimit-Limit` / `X-RateLimit-Remaining` / `X-RateLimit-Reset` describe the per-minute bucket state. The per-day per-org limits per tier (sized at ~100× typical daily volume — the dimension exists to bound failure modes, not to monetize) are: Free 1000/org/day, Starter 5000, Professional 25000, Enterprise unlimited. On rare infrastructure-side failures the gateway fails OPEN and passes the request through with `X-RateLimit-Check: skipped` on the response — clients can treat that as a transient signal that quota enforcement was briefly degraded. - `500`: Persistence failed while materialising the acting-capacity graph. The code names the failing entity table plus verb: `PERSONS_LOOKUP_FAILED`, `PERSONS_INSERT_FAILED`, `COMPANIES_LOOKUP_FAILED`, `COMPANIES_INSERT_FAILED`, `ROLES_LOOKUP_FAILED`, or `ROLES_INSERT_FAILED`. Transient server-side failures — retry shortly. - `502`: Altinn upstream unavailable — `ALTINN_UPSTREAM_ERROR`. Retry shortly. - `503`: Two codes share this status: `SERVER_MISCONFIGURED` — `RECEIPT_HMAC_SECRET` missing or shorter than 64 chars (operator action: regenerate via `openssl rand -hex 64` and set in the deployment env); or `SERVICE_NOT_YET_AVAILABLE` — the live Altinn integration is not enabled in this deployment (`ALTINN_MODE`), so real acting-capacity data cannot be served yet. Neither is caller-fixable. --- [API](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/revisions/9ec19bc87311?raw)