---
title: "Delete the authenticated consumer's account (GDPR Article 17 erasure)"
method: DELETE
path: "/api/v1/account"
tags: ["Account"]
---

# Delete the authenticated consumer's account (GDPR Article 17 erasure)

`DELETE /api/v1/account`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://www.apier.no`
- URL: `https://www.apier.no/api/v1/account`
- Auth: API key in cookie `sb-access-token`

Hard-deletes the SESSION-AUTHENTICATED consumer's account: the api_consumers row plus everything that cascades from it (API keys, delegations, approval tokens, idempotency keys, saved profiles, subscriptions and their pending webhook queue), then the backing auth identity. The deletion target is ALWAYS the session-resolved consumer — a request body is never read on this path, so a body-supplied id or email is inert (the operator-run twin with an explicit target lives outside this spec at /api/admin/erase-consumer). Sequence is load-bearing: a pre-delete audit record is written first (append-only, survives the erasure), the database erasure then runs as ONE transaction via the delete_consumer_cascade RPC, and the auth identity is removed LAST — so a failure at any step can never strand a half-deleted account silently. Idempotent: deleting an already-deleted account returns a clean success (consumer_found: false), never a 500. Immutable audit records (audit_log, api_audit_log, risk_pattern_hits, webhook_deliveries and similar append-only tables) deliberately survive with a reference to the erased account for integrity; where such a record holds a NOT NULL foreign key to one of the account's API keys or subscriptions, that key/subscription row is retained in a revoked, tombstoned form (a SHA-256 hash with no personal data) rather than deleted. As the final deletion step the anonymize_consumer routine scrubs the retained references INLINE — the account's consumer id and any personal payloads on those forensic records are nulled or tombstoned so the retained rows no longer identify the account (reported by the anonymized field; the records themselves survive for legal/forensic integrity). Inline rate limit 5/hour per consumer, fail-CLOSED.

## Response `200`

Account deleted. auth_user_removed=false with auth_cleanup_required=true signals a PARTIAL success: the database record is deleted but the auth identity survived a failed cleanup call and needs manual removal (operators are alerted via Sentry) — the caller must never believe nothing happened. consumer_found=false signals an idempotent no-op (the account was already gone).

- object
  - `success` true, required
  - `data` object, required
    - `deleted` true, required: Always true on 200 — the account no longer exists after this response (whether this request deleted it or a previous one already had).
    - `consumer_found` boolean, required: false = the account row was already absent (idempotent no-op re-delete).
    - `auth_user_removed` boolean, required: false = the auth identity survived a failed cleanup call (partial success — see auth_cleanup_required).
    - `auth_cleanup_required` boolean, required: true = the database record is deleted but the auth.users identity needs manual removal by an operator. Always the inverse of auth_user_removed.
    - `anonymized` boolean, required: true = the post-deletion anonymisation scrub completed — the erased account's identity link and any personal payloads on the retained append-only forensic records were nulled/tombstoned. Best-effort: false means the deletion still succeeded but the scrub failed and was captured for retry (operators alerted via Sentry); it never blocks a completed erasure.
    - `summary` object, nullable, required: Rows-touched-per-table summary returned by the transactional deletion (e.g. api_keys_deleted, api_keys_retained, subscriptions_retained, webhook_queue_cancelled) — the same object is preserved on the completion audit record.
    - `residual_note` string, required: Verbatim statement of the append-only residual: immutable audit and forensic records are retained for integrity and legal traceability, but this request also anonymises them inline — the reference to the account and any personal payloads those records held are scrubbed as part of the deletion, so the retained records no longer identify the account.
  - `_meta` TrustMetadata, required: Metadata included in every response for trust and verifiability.
    - `rulebook_version` string, required: Current Rulebook version. Internal rule-version records carry structured origin metadata (`initial_seed` | `human_review` | `lovdata_drift_response` | `audit_finding` | `customer_question` | `legal_correction`) for operator forensics, but that attribution is deliberately NOT exposed on public responses to avoid leaking operational signal.
    - `data_freshness` string, date-time, required: When this data was last fetched (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `last_verified` string, date-time, required: When this data was last verified against source (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `source` string, required: Origin of this data. Defaults to `apier.no`. The agent-readiness probe (`GET /api/v1/health/agent-readiness`) is the one surface that may instead emit `apier.no telemetry` — it does so when at least one of its endpoint rates came from measured live telemetry, and falls back to `apier.no` when every rate is a static default; all other endpoints always emit `apier.no`.
    - `data_source` string: Authoritative origin of the underlying data (listed alongside rulebook_version, data_freshness, last_verified, legal_basis for Rulebook-influenced endpoints). Distinct from `source` (the response origin): `data_source` identifies the authoritative data publisher — e.g. 'Brønnøysund Enhetsregisteret + Apier Universal Rulebook'. Present on registry-backed endpoints.
    - `served_from` 'cache' | 'live' | 'static': Cache-aware endpoints only — 'cache' when the response was served from the local copy, 'live' when the gateway just refreshed from the upstream, 'static' when the payload was computed deterministically from pure code with no DB or upstream read (e.g. /v1/public/deadlines). Absent on endpoints that don't carry this semantic.
    - `stale` boolean: Cache-aware endpoints only — true when the upstream was unreachable and a within-limit cached row was served as a fallback. Absent on normal responses.
    - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the time of the response; matches `info.version`. Always present on every `/v1/*` response so a future schema break can be traced to the exact rows / audit events that predate / postdate it. Agent-facing machine interfaces (v1/capabilities, workflows.json) may override with their own narrower surface version; all other endpoints inherit the manifest-level version.
    - `legal_basis` string: Legal basis under which the response data is reused. Present on Rulebook-influenced endpoints (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /v1/company/{org}/deadlines). Common value: 'NLOD — public registry reuse'.
    - `rule_count` integer: Rule-evaluation count — total rules evaluated for this request. Present on endpoints that invoke the Rulebook evaluator (v1/company/{org}/obligations).
    - `applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `not_applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'not_applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `insufficient_data_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'insufficient_data' (Tier 2 gated). Present on evaluator endpoints. rule_count = applicable_count + not_applicable_count + insufficient_data_count.
    - `cache_age_ms` integer, nullable: Cache layer: milliseconds since the cached row was computed, or null on a cache miss (served_from === 'live'). Agents use it alongside data_freshness as a staleness signal. Present on endpoints wired to the cache (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /deadlines, /summary, /v1/public/obligations, /v1/public/deadlines).
    - `response_time_ms` integer: Speed signal: total server-side processing time in milliseconds, measured via performance.now() at the route boundary. Mirrored on the `X-Apier-Response-Time-Ms` header so agents can key on it without parsing the body. Present on every endpoint.
    - `response_timestamp` string, date-time: RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 UTC timestamp stamped by the response builder at wire-exit. Mirrored on the `provenance_log.response_timestamp` column by a fire-and-forget writer. Distinct from `data_freshness` (when upstream data was fetched) and `last_verified` (when the citation was verified); this is the moment the envelope left the server. Always populated at runtime — deliberately left out of the `required` list to avoid a cascading contract change that would invalidate every pre-existing example envelope in this spec (append-only response contracts). A future revision may promote it into the `required` list alongside a bulk example refresh.
    - `response_hash` string: SHA-256 hash of the canonical-JSON form of the envelope with `_meta` stripped before hashing, prefixed with `sha256:`. Mirrored on `provenance_log.response_hash` so a consumer can independently re-hash the bytes they received and compare against what we persisted (integrity receipt). Stripping `_meta` is load-bearing: volatile fields (response_time_ms, cache_age_ms, served_from) and the hash itself would otherwise feed into the digest and break the cache-hit-bytewise-identical invariant.
    - `source_snapshot_id` string: Optional free-text pointer into an upstream sync snapshot the response derives from — e.g. a Brreg sync's `brreg-<ISO>` snapshot id. Absent when the response is not tied to a specific upstream snapshot (capabilities, tools, static deadlines).
    - `is_sandbox` true: Present and `true` only when the response was generated from sandbox fixture data (currently `ALTINN_MODE=sandbox` on `/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity`). Absent (NOT `false`) on every other response — the absent-vs-false distinction is deliberate so downstream agents branching on `if (response._meta.is_sandbox)` cannot be misled into treating non-sandbox responses as positively-confirmed-not-sandbox. Distinct from the `/v1/sandbox/*` `is_sandbox: true` literal in `SandboxMeta` (which carries the sandbox surface tag); this flag rides through the production `/api/v1/altinn/*` surface to forensically tag a sandbox-mode response that an OEM evaluator received.
    - `cost_nok` number: What this call debited from the caller's prepaid credit balance, in NOK, rendered from the integer-øre ledger (50 øre → 0.5; the ledger itself never leaves whole øre and no float arithmetic touches a balance). Present on the 2xx body of every metered company-data read — the same debit that sets the `X-Credits-Cost-Ore` header, so the two never disagree. `0` when nothing was charged: credit enforcement running dark (the response then also carries `X-Credit-Check: shadow`) or the sandbox surface. Absent on unmetered endpoints and on error envelopes — a refunded 5xx/403/404 claims no cost rather than a wrong one. Lives under `_meta`, which `response_hash` excludes, so the provenance receipt is unaffected; the route's ETag is computed before the credit wrapper stamps it, so a conditional request can still short-circuit to 304. Append-only addition.
    - `wallet_remaining_nok` number, nullable: The prepaid credit balance remaining AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; mirrors the `X-Credits-Balance-Ore` header). `null` when no balance was read: credit enforcement running dark, or the sandbox surface. Present wherever `cost_nok` is. An agent planning a sequence of metered calls can divide this by the per-call price from GET /api/v1/pricing to know how many reads remain before a 402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS. Append-only addition.
    - `spend_cap_remaining_nok` number: What the calling key may still spend under its tighter spend cap (Europe/Oslo calendar day or month) AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; never below 0). Present on the 2xx body of a metered read only when credit enforcement is live AND the key has a daily or monthly cap (set with PATCH /api/v1/account/keys/{id}); absent otherwise. When it reaches 0 the next metered call on this key returns 402 SPEND_CAP_REACHED until the cap resets. Append-only addition.

## Other responses

- `401`: SESSION_REQUIRED — no session cookie. This surface is session-authenticated (dashboard), never Bearer-key: a leaked API key must not be able to destroy the account that owns it.
- `429`: RATE_LIMITED — more than 5 deletion attempts within the rolling hour for this consumer. Retry-After header carries the seconds-until-reset.
- `500`: ACCOUNT_DELETION_FAILED — the transactional erasure failed BEFORE any data was removed (the RPC is one transaction, so nothing changed). Safe to retry.

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/revisions/9ec19bc87311?raw)