---
title: "Consumer-wide audit trail for the dashboard activity view"
method: GET
path: "/api/v1/account/audit"
tags: ["Account"]
---

# Consumer-wide audit trail for the dashboard activity view

`GET /api/v1/account/audit`

## Request

- Base URL: `https://www.apier.no`
- URL: `https://www.apier.no/api/v1/account/audit`
- Auth: API key in cookie `sb-access-token`

Returns the signed-in consumer's OWN audit_log slice across ALL organisations (including system-scoped rows like api_key.create / system.cron_run that carry no org_number), newest first, keyset-paginated. The browser/session-cookie sibling of GET /api/v1/company/{org}/audit (the Bearer/agent surface, which is per-org and gated on read:audit). Session-cookie auth (NOT Bearer, no scope). Cross-tenant boundary: the session-resolved consumer_id is applied as an explicit `.eq('consumer_id', $1)` predicate (RLS via auth.uid() cannot serve this read because api_consumers.id ≠ Supabase auth.uid()). `details` is auto-redacted on sensitive keys. Conditional GET supported (strong ETag, If-None-Match → 304); Cache-Control private.

## Query parameters

- `limit` integer
- `cursor` string
- `before` string, date-time
- `before_id` string, uuid
- `since` string, date-time
- `until` string, date-time
- `action` 'delegation.create' | 'delegation.revoke' | 'approval_token.mint' | 'approval_token.used' | 'api_key.create' | 'api_key.revoke' | 'gov_api.call' | 'registry.upsert' | 'system.cron_run' | 'privacy.dsr' | 'subscription.create' | 'subscription.delete' | 'webhook.delivered' | 'dry_run_execute' | 'risk_elevated_response' | 'risk_elevated_shadow' | 'risk_pattern_override_applied' | 'submit_mva_started' | 'submit_mva' | 'submit_mva_failed' | 'execute_authorization_failed' | 'rate_limit_blocked' | 'idempotency_replay' | 'altinn.list_acting_capacity' | 'brreg.get_company_profile' | 'write_conflict_blocked': Closed enumeration of audit_log action identifiers — single source of truth for both response bodies and query-parameter filters on the audit-trail read surface. Mirrors `AUDIT_ACTIONS` Adding a new value is a one-line append HERE that propagates via $ref to every consumer. Append-only — renaming a value is a /v2 break.
- `initiated_by` 'human' | 'agent' | 'cron' | 'system' | 'unknown': Closed enumeration of `initiated_by` classifier values — single source of truth for both response bodies and query-parameter filters on the audit-trail read surface. Mirrors `INITIATED_BY_VALUEShuman` = write action confirmed via the X-Approval-Token UI flow. `agent` = self-identifying AI client OR an unattended write without approval. `cron` = scheduled job hitting /api/cron/* with the configured CRON_SECRET. `system` = reserved for future internal service-to-service calls. `unknown` = read verbs without other signals, plus the historical-row backfill default for pre-correlation-id rows.

## Headers

- `If-None-Match` string

## Response `200`

A page of the consumer's audit entries, newest first. Empty data array when the consumer has no audit rows (NEVER 404).

- object
  - `success` true, required
  - `data` object, required
    - `data` AccountAuditLogEntry[], required
      - `id` string, uuid, required: Row identifier (audit_log.id) — also the deterministic tiebreak in the (timestamp, id) keyset ordering.
      - `timestamp` string, date-time, required: ISO 8601 UTC timestamp the action was recorded (TIMESTAMPTZ column).
      - `org_number` string, nullable, required: 9-digit Norwegian organisation number, or NULL for system-scoped rows (api_key.create, system.cron_run) that have no org context. NULLABLE on this consumer-wide surface — contrast AuditLogEntry, where the per-org reader's filter makes it non-null.
      - `action` 'delegation.create' | 'delegation.revoke' | 'approval_token.mint' | 'approval_token.used' | 'api_key.create' | 'api_key.revoke' | 'gov_api.call' | 'registry.upsert' | 'system.cron_run' | 'privacy.dsr' | 'subscription.create' | 'subscription.delete' | 'webhook.delivered' | 'dry_run_execute' | 'risk_elevated_response' | 'risk_elevated_shadow' | 'risk_pattern_override_applied' | 'submit_mva_started' | 'submit_mva' | 'submit_mva_failed' | 'execute_authorization_failed' | 'rate_limit_blocked' | 'idempotency_replay' | 'altinn.list_acting_capacity' | 'brreg.get_company_profile' | 'write_conflict_blocked', required: Closed enumeration of audit_log action identifiers — single source of truth for both response bodies and query-parameter filters on the audit-trail read surface. Mirrors `AUDIT_ACTIONS` Adding a new value is a one-line append HERE that propagates via $ref to every consumer. Append-only — renaming a value is a /v2 break.
      - `gov_api_response_status` integer, nullable, required: HTTP status from an upstream government API call when applicable; null for non-gov actions.
      - `rule_version` string, nullable, required: Rulebook version the action was evaluated under, when rule-driven; null otherwise.
      - `system_user_id` string, nullable, required: Altinn 3 System User identifier when applicable; null for non-Altinn actions.
      - `correlation_id` string, uuid, required: Request-scope UUID joining this row to provenance_log, evaluation_snapshots, receipts, and compliance_state_events from the same HTTP request.
      - `initiated_by` 'human' | 'agent' | 'cron' | 'system' | 'unknown', required: Closed enumeration of `initiated_by` classifier values — single source of truth for both response bodies and query-parameter filters on the audit-trail read surface. Mirrors `INITIATED_BY_VALUEShuman` = write action confirmed via the X-Approval-Token UI flow. `agent` = self-identifying AI client OR an unattended write without approval. `cron` = scheduled job hitting /api/cron/* with the configured CRON_SECRET. `system` = reserved for future internal service-to-service calls. `unknown` = read verbs without other signals, plus the historical-row backfill default for pre-correlation-id rows.
      - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the moment of the audit write.
      - `details` object, required: Action-specific JSONB metadata. Auto-redacted ([REDACTED]) on sensitive keys at both writer- and read-side layers. Shape varies by action; treat as opaque unless the action is recognised.
    - `pagination` AuditPagination, required: Keyset-pagination metadata for the audit-trail read surface. The CANONICAL continuation token is `next_cursor` - an opaque HMAC-signed cursor passed back verbatim as `cursor=` for the next page. The legacy keyset tuple - `next_before` + `next_before_id`, the (timestamp, id) pair of the LAST ROW OF THIS RESPONSE'S `data` array, passed back as `before=` AND `before_id=` - keeps working through the deprecation window (Sunset: 2027-01-31T00:00:00Z); requests using it receive Deprecation/Sunset/Link response headers. The runtime only emits continuation fields inside the `has_more && rows.length > 0` guard, so a terminal page lands with all three absent. The schema enforces the legacy cursor as a tuple at THREE complementary layers: (1) `dependentRequired` rejects the half-tuple shape; (2) when `has_more: true`, the continuation fields are REQUIRED via `allOf`/`if/then`; (3) when `has_more: false`, they MUST BE ABSENT.
      - `limit` integer, required: Echo of the page size in effect for this response.
      - `has_more` boolean, required: True when older rows beyond this page exist. Computed via the limit+1 lookahead — the (limit+1)-th row is fetched but not returned; only its presence is surfaced here. When true, both `next_before` and `next_before_id` are required; when false, both MUST BE ABSENT (enforced by the schema-level `allOf`/`if/then` clauses).
      - `next_before` string, date-time: Timestamp of the last row in `data`. Pass back as `before=` for the next page. ABSENT when has_more is false (terminal page); REQUIRED when has_more is true. All-or-nothing tuple companion of `next_before_id`.
      - `next_before_id` string, uuid: Id of the last row in `data`. Pass back as `before_id=` for the next page. ABSENT when has_more is false (terminal page); REQUIRED when has_more is true. All-or-nothing tuple companion of `next_before` — the keyset cursor is (timestamp, id).
      - `next_cursor` string: Opaque HMAC-signed continuation token - the CANONICAL way to fetch the next page. Pass back verbatim as `cursor=`. ABSENT when has_more is false (terminal page); REQUIRED when has_more is true. Tamper-evident: an edited cursor is rejected with 400 CURSOR_INVALID.
  - `_meta` TrustMetadata, required: Metadata included in every response for trust and verifiability.
    - `rulebook_version` string, required: Current Rulebook version. Internal rule-version records carry structured origin metadata (`initial_seed` | `human_review` | `lovdata_drift_response` | `audit_finding` | `customer_question` | `legal_correction`) for operator forensics, but that attribution is deliberately NOT exposed on public responses to avoid leaking operational signal.
    - `data_freshness` string, date-time, required: When this data was last fetched (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `last_verified` string, date-time, required: When this data was last verified against source (ISO 8601 UTC).
    - `source` string, required: Origin of this data. Defaults to `apier.no`. The agent-readiness probe (`GET /api/v1/health/agent-readiness`) is the one surface that may instead emit `apier.no telemetry` — it does so when at least one of its endpoint rates came from measured live telemetry, and falls back to `apier.no` when every rate is a static default; all other endpoints always emit `apier.no`.
    - `data_source` string: Authoritative origin of the underlying data (listed alongside rulebook_version, data_freshness, last_verified, legal_basis for Rulebook-influenced endpoints). Distinct from `source` (the response origin): `data_source` identifies the authoritative data publisher — e.g. 'Brønnøysund Enhetsregisteret + Apier Universal Rulebook'. Present on registry-backed endpoints.
    - `served_from` 'cache' | 'live' | 'static': Cache-aware endpoints only — 'cache' when the response was served from the local copy, 'live' when the gateway just refreshed from the upstream, 'static' when the payload was computed deterministically from pure code with no DB or upstream read (e.g. /v1/public/deadlines). Absent on endpoints that don't carry this semantic.
    - `stale` boolean: Cache-aware endpoints only — true when the upstream was unreachable and a within-limit cached row was served as a fallback. Absent on normal responses.
    - `schema_version` string, required: OpenAPI contract version at the time of the response; matches `info.version`. Always present on every `/v1/*` response so a future schema break can be traced to the exact rows / audit events that predate / postdate it. Agent-facing machine interfaces (v1/capabilities, workflows.json) may override with their own narrower surface version; all other endpoints inherit the manifest-level version.
    - `legal_basis` string: Legal basis under which the response data is reused. Present on Rulebook-influenced endpoints (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /v1/company/{org}/deadlines). Common value: 'NLOD — public registry reuse'.
    - `rule_count` integer: Rule-evaluation count — total rules evaluated for this request. Present on endpoints that invoke the Rulebook evaluator (v1/company/{org}/obligations).
    - `applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `not_applicable_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'not_applicable'. Present on evaluator endpoints.
    - `insufficient_data_count` integer: Count of rules whose evaluation_result is 'insufficient_data' (Tier 2 gated). Present on evaluator endpoints. rule_count = applicable_count + not_applicable_count + insufficient_data_count.
    - `cache_age_ms` integer, nullable: Cache layer: milliseconds since the cached row was computed, or null on a cache miss (served_from === 'live'). Agents use it alongside data_freshness as a staleness signal. Present on endpoints wired to the cache (v1/company/{org}/obligations, /deadlines, /summary, /v1/public/obligations, /v1/public/deadlines).
    - `response_time_ms` integer: Speed signal: total server-side processing time in milliseconds, measured via performance.now() at the route boundary. Mirrored on the `X-Apier-Response-Time-Ms` header so agents can key on it without parsing the body. Present on every endpoint.
    - `response_timestamp` string, date-time: RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 UTC timestamp stamped by the response builder at wire-exit. Mirrored on the `provenance_log.response_timestamp` column by a fire-and-forget writer. Distinct from `data_freshness` (when upstream data was fetched) and `last_verified` (when the citation was verified); this is the moment the envelope left the server. Always populated at runtime — deliberately left out of the `required` list to avoid a cascading contract change that would invalidate every pre-existing example envelope in this spec (append-only response contracts). A future revision may promote it into the `required` list alongside a bulk example refresh.
    - `response_hash` string: SHA-256 hash of the canonical-JSON form of the envelope with `_meta` stripped before hashing, prefixed with `sha256:`. Mirrored on `provenance_log.response_hash` so a consumer can independently re-hash the bytes they received and compare against what we persisted (integrity receipt). Stripping `_meta` is load-bearing: volatile fields (response_time_ms, cache_age_ms, served_from) and the hash itself would otherwise feed into the digest and break the cache-hit-bytewise-identical invariant.
    - `source_snapshot_id` string: Optional free-text pointer into an upstream sync snapshot the response derives from — e.g. a Brreg sync's `brreg-<ISO>` snapshot id. Absent when the response is not tied to a specific upstream snapshot (capabilities, tools, static deadlines).
    - `is_sandbox` true: Present and `true` only when the response was generated from sandbox fixture data (currently `ALTINN_MODE=sandbox` on `/api/v1/altinn/list-acting-capacity`). Absent (NOT `false`) on every other response — the absent-vs-false distinction is deliberate so downstream agents branching on `if (response._meta.is_sandbox)` cannot be misled into treating non-sandbox responses as positively-confirmed-not-sandbox. Distinct from the `/v1/sandbox/*` `is_sandbox: true` literal in `SandboxMeta` (which carries the sandbox surface tag); this flag rides through the production `/api/v1/altinn/*` surface to forensically tag a sandbox-mode response that an OEM evaluator received.
    - `cost_nok` number: What this call debited from the caller's prepaid credit balance, in NOK, rendered from the integer-øre ledger (50 øre → 0.5; the ledger itself never leaves whole øre and no float arithmetic touches a balance). Present on the 2xx body of every metered company-data read — the same debit that sets the `X-Credits-Cost-Ore` header, so the two never disagree. `0` when nothing was charged: credit enforcement running dark (the response then also carries `X-Credit-Check: shadow`) or the sandbox surface. Absent on unmetered endpoints and on error envelopes — a refunded 5xx/403/404 claims no cost rather than a wrong one. Lives under `_meta`, which `response_hash` excludes, so the provenance receipt is unaffected; the route's ETag is computed before the credit wrapper stamps it, so a conditional request can still short-circuit to 304. Append-only addition.
    - `wallet_remaining_nok` number, nullable: The prepaid credit balance remaining AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; mirrors the `X-Credits-Balance-Ore` header). `null` when no balance was read: credit enforcement running dark, or the sandbox surface. Present wherever `cost_nok` is. An agent planning a sequence of metered calls can divide this by the per-call price from GET /api/v1/pricing to know how many reads remain before a 402 INSUFFICIENT_CREDITS. Append-only addition.
    - `spend_cap_remaining_nok` number: What the calling key may still spend under its tighter spend cap (Europe/Oslo calendar day or month) AFTER this call's debit, in NOK (same rendering as `cost_nok`; never below 0). Present on the 2xx body of a metered read only when credit enforcement is live AND the key has a daily or monthly cap (set with PATCH /api/v1/account/keys/{id}); absent otherwise. When it reaches 0 the next metered call on this key returns 402 SPEND_CAP_REACHED until the cap resets. Append-only addition.

## Other responses

- `304`: Not Modified — the If-None-Match value matched the current ETag. Empty body; the strong ETag is re-sent on the header.
- `400`: Invalid query parameters (bad limit, half a keyset cursor, since > until, unknown action/initiated_by, or a duplicated query key).
- `401`: No session cookie.
- `500`: Unexpected DB error reading the audit trail (no internal detail leaks; the error is in Sentry under this request's correlation_id).

---

[API](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc.dev/apier/apis/apier-no-api/revisions/9ec19bc87311?raw)